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 Preface 
This paper was produced as part of a more comprehensive research project on ‘European Po-
licy for Global Development’ under the direction of Dr. Sven Grimm, funded by the German 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The project analyses the Euro-
pean Union’s capabilities to engage in global policy. In this regard, the project looks into the 
management of policy nexuses, i.e. it analyses new EU initiatives and instruments (aid effec-
tiveness), the institutional setup (aid architecture) and the coherence for development. The 
project approaches issues of coherence and coordination within the EU’s complex system of 
multi-level governance, encompassing the European as well as the Member State level. It 
deals with two thematic areas (‘trade’ and ‘security’) as well as their relation to development 
policy. In addition, the project analyses the challenges the EU faces from emerging internati-
onal actors (particularly China). Furthermore, the project assesses the EU’s capabilities in 
dealing with these emerging actors in order to engage in global development. This discussion 
paper has been prepared within this third work section. 
Over the last years, “new donors” have increased their aid to developing countries, in some 
cases quite significantly. This evolution coincides with major reform initiatives of the interna-
tional aid system aiming at increasing aid effectiveness and reaching the step of being imple-
mented. “New donors”, however, provide their aid outside the framework of established in-
ternational structures, i.e. beyond the international consensus on development. The conse-
quences of the engagement of new donors for developing countries and for the international 
aid system are currently widely discussed in the development community. China’s engage-
ment in Africa, the consequences for African development as well as consequences for Euro-
pean development policy lie at the core of this debate. The topic of the discussion paper is 
therefore highly relevant in the context of international discussion on aid effectiveness. In 
addition, the topic also matters from international relations perspective, for instance with re-
gard to the question of the integration of new major actors in international structures. 
This discussion paper provides a comparison of the policy approaches of European and Chi-
nese development policies in the context of their overall engagement in external relations with 
African countries. The paper, however, does not look at the practice of both European and 
Chinese policies in Africa, nor does it further elaborate on African perspectives on both ac-
tors’ policies. This will need to be done in upcoming research. 
The paper primarily draws on major European and Chinese policy documents. In addition, the 
paper builds on a number of interviews that the author conducted in Beijing with scholars 
from Chinese research institutions, Western diplomats as well as representatives of non-state 
organisations. 
I would like to thank Dr. Sven Grimm for his time and valuable input while I was preparing 
this discussion paper. I greatly appreciate his help and have benefited a great deal from the 
discussions held with him. Furthermore, I would also like to thank the other members of the 
project team: Dr. Stefan Gänzle and Davina Makhan as well as my other colleagues: Dr. Gui-
do Ashoff, Dr. Erik Lundsgaarde, Stefan Leiderer, Dr. Doris Fischer and Prof. Dr. Dirk 
Messner. Finally, special thanks go to Gertrud Frankenreiter and Fatia Elsermann for their 
enduring technical support. The usual disclaimer applies. 
Christine Hackenesch                   Bonn, July 2009 
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Executive Summary 
“New donors” such as India, Brazil or the Arab states have recently increased their aid to 
developing countries. These countries provide their aid outside the framework of established 
international structures. The consequences of their engagement for developing countries and 
for the international aid system – that is undergoing important reforms – is being widely dis-
cussed in the development community. At the core of this debate lies China’s engagement in 
Africa, its consequences for development in Africa and how it relates to European develop-
ment policy. 
China’s engagement in Africa is highly debated in Europe and has caused different initiatives 
throughout the European Union to foster cooperation with China and with African nations. 
These initiatives have in common that they are taking mainly place at the dialogue level, 
while in the medium and long-term perspective they aim at creating more comprehensive co-
operation. From an aid effectiveness perspective, cooperation as well as competition and con-
flict between European and Chinese development policies in Africa could each entail positive 
and negative consequences for development in Africa. Arguably, the role of African countries 
will determine to a large extent if cooperation, competition or conflict between European and 
Chinese development policies will be beneficial for development in Africa. Only if African 
countries take ownership and actively shape the relationship with fund providers, external 
engagement is likely to have positive consequences for development. 
For the time being, however, it is unclear to what extent it will be possible to establish con-
crete cooperation projects between the EU and China that respect African countries’ owner-
ship. The objective of this paper is therefore to compare Chinese and European development 
policies approaches in the context of their overall relations towards Africa in order to identify 
aspects and elements of both sides policy approaches that will possibly influence the structure 
of the future relationship between European and Chinese development policies in Africa 
countries. 
Differing overall approaches: European and Chinese values, objectives and principles  
The objectives, principles and values of China and the EU’s development policy in Africa, 
form a complex picture and at least the rhetoric differs considerably. Both actors apply differ-
ent approaches in their policies towards Africa, and both actors have a different understanding 
of how development policy relates to other areas of external relations. 
Since the turn of the century, the EU has been reforming its Africa policy and its development 
policy in order to overcome the traditional donor-recipient relationship and to create a strate-
gic partnership, embracing internationally agreed principles such as ownership, equality and 
alignment. Alongside Europe’s development cooperation, trade and foreign policy constitute 
distinct policy areas, although the EU increasingly acknowledges that these policies also have 
an impact on the development prospects of partner countries and thus aspires to better coordi-
nate them with development policy.  
In contrast to the EU, the Chinese government does not clearly distinguish between develop-
ment and foreign policy, elaborating a very comprehensive approach towards Africa. The 
originality of China’s Africa policy precisely lies in the close linkage of development assis-
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tance to the provision of resources, foreign direct investment, trade flows and diplomatic ini-
tiatives. This lack of distinction makes it difficult to assess China’s policy. However, this does 
not necessarily imply that Chinese engagement is less effective for African development.  
Although Chinese and European objectives of development policy have some common 
ground, they differ considerably in many aspects. China primarily focuses on the promotion 
of economic and social development and sees the establishment of peace and security as an 
important condition for development. Hence, it pursues rather traditional objectives of devel-
opment policy. The promotion of peace and security is an objective of China’s policy towards 
Africa, even though China does not actively contribute to its promotion in the context of its 
development assistance. The European Union, for its part, designs its objectives and princi-
ples of development policy closely in line with international agreements. Poverty reduction 
and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, therefore, represent core objec-
tives of European development policy. The EU also aims at promoting a political and eco-
nomic environment that is favourable for development. The objectives as well as the areas in 
which European development policy is engaged are thus broader than China’s objectives and 
fields of engagement. In addition, the EU clearly puts much more emphasis on political 
development, an aspect which is, for obvious reasons, mostly absent in China’s strategies. 
China’s principles of non-interference and non-conditionality in contrast to European attempts 
of promoting democracy, human rights and good governance are probably the most difficult 
and disputed areas. China’s policy does not comply with standards and norms set by the tradi-
tional donor community. Therefore, China represents a welcomed alternative for African 
governments, possibly weakening the leverage of traditional donors, while creating increasing 
bargaining power for African governments. Although, the concrete consequences of China’s 
engagement for European attempts of promoting good governance, human rights, and democ-
racy as yet are not clear. 
Is development policy succumbing to strategic interests? 
Since the end of the Cold War and in the light of declining economic and strategic importance 
of Africa, the promotion of values and norms in the European-African relationship has be-
come more important. It is, however, necessary to note that the promotion of human rights 
and democracy became more prominent against the background of decreasing economic and 
security interests.  
Compared to other regions, European resource and particularly economic interests in Africa 
are currently rather small, whereas for China, resources from countries such as Angola or 
Sudan as well as African markets play an increasingly important role.  
Resource and energy interests, competition and conflicts between the EU and China could 
arise, depending on how the interests on both sides evolve in this area. China’s development 
policy is inter alia closely linked to its resources interests. The EU increasingly highlights the 
nexus between energy security and development, and integrated energy security issues in de-
veloping countries in the spectrum of its development policy. Even though the African conti-
nent is currently an important, but far from the only provider of resources, the EU seems to 
increasingly recognise the potential of African countries as energy providers. Comparing 
Chinese and European political interests in Africa indicate that, for both, relations with Afri-
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can countries constitute an important element in how they are emerging and changing strate-
gies towards global politics. The EU wants to foster ‘effective multilateralism’, relying on the 
cooperation with Africa as one important element to achieve this objective. China, however, 
aims at promoting a ‘harmonious world’, composed of sovereign nation states that cohabit 
peacefully. African support, particularly in international relations, is also important for China. 
Recent voting patterns in several UN bodies seem to indicate that Europe and China could be 
increasingly competing in this regard. 
Increasing need for cooperation among actors in Europe and in China 
Europe and China both face important challenges with regard to the actors involved in their 
development policy and overall cooperation with Africa. In Europe shared competency for 
development aid persist at both the community and national level. In recent years the range of 
actors involved in European development policy has been expanding due to EU-Africa rela-
tions opening up for African non-state actors and the increase of EU members. Furthermore, 
actors have become increasingly aware of linkages between development policy and other 
policy areas. European reform initiatives hence aim at increasing coherence and coordinating 
in order to reduce the high fragmentation among European actors. In China, not only the co-
operation between different actors needs to be improved, but also the regulatory and imple-
mentation capacities of the state; conflicting interests between different stakeholders emerge 
and test the state’s capacities to enforce regulations abroad. As a consequence of the general 
intensification of Sino-African relations, the number of actors involved in China’s relations 
with Africa has recently been increasing, even though state actors and state-to-state relations 
still dominate China’s Africa policy. China’s policy towards Africa involves private enter-
prises and particularly civil society actors only to a limited degree, even though the govern-
ment has recently taken some initiatives to foster their engagement. 
In Europe and China, different types of actors are responsible for development cooperation 
and overall relations with Africa. In China, the Ministry of Commerce takes a prominent role, 
indicating a strong relation between development and trade policy. In Europe, specific actors 
are in charge of aid policies, such as the specialised Directorate-General for Development at 
the EU level or national ministries of development cooperation (or departments in foreign 
ministries). Arguably, this institutional separation reduces to some extent the possibility that 
development policy is instrumentalised by other foreign relations interests. Yet, with institu-
tional changes occurring, it will be important to see, which domestic actors will gain influence 
on Europe’s Africa policy-making, and to follow their respective interests in relations with 
Africa. 
Different focal areas of European and Chinese development policy 
China and the EU cover similar areas in their development policy, although both set different 
foci. After the end of the Cold War, European development policy became more poverty-
oriented, while at the same time new sectors such as security issues, trade liberalisation, the 
promotion of democracy and human rights, energy security, conflict prevention and fragile 
states have increasingly been added to the spectrum of development policy issues. This broad 
range of issues increases complexity and creates problems of coordination between the EU 
Commission and member states. By implementing reform initiatives, such as the European 
code of conduct on division of labour, European actors seek to address stronger needs for co-
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ordinating and cooperating in order to enhance the effectiveness of European aid. 
Sino-African cooperation covers a wide range of areas from bi- and multilateral political co-
operation, economic cooperation, cooperation in social development as well as in peace and 
security. Since 2000, cooperation has been widened and deepened in many fields. Chinese 
development assistance in a narrower sense, i.e. closer to the Western understanding of aid, 
focuses on projects in five major areas: health, agriculture, education and infrastructure, with 
infrastructure projects taking the major bulk of these projects.  
Various factors influencing prospects for future cooperation between the EU and China  
In the light of very different European and Chinese policy approaches, norms and principles 
in their cooperation with African countries, concrete cooperation will depend on results of 
dialogues initiatives that are already in place. It is unlikely that fundamental changes will oc-
cur in underlying belief systems, perceptions or strategic cultures of China or the EU in the 
near future. Mutual understanding of the perceptions, norms and values of the partner, how-
ever, could already represent an important first step, which could facilitate future cooperation. 
Potentially more far-reaching, the evolution of Chinese and European economic and resource 
interests in comparison to political and other interests will influence prospects for concrete 
cooperation. The evolution of European resource and economic interests in Africa, which are 
currently rather low, will certainly influence the willingness and capacities of European actors 
to push for cooperation. The same can be expected for China. China’s willingness to cooper-
ate will also depend largely on the overall benefits China could gain through cooperation. For 
the time being, China’s attractiveness for African countries results partly from the fact that 
China is not a member of the “donor club”, but acts outside the existing structures. It can thus 
be referred to when Western donors refuse funding. Despite that African countries use their 
Chinese “joker”, China’s growing investments and trade activities are likely to cause an in-
crease of China’s interest in cooperation with other external actors in Africa, since it has in-
creasingly more to lose in cases when critical situations such as political turmoil and eco-
nomic crisis arise in African countries. 
Against this background, constellations and power structures among domestic actors in the 
EU and in China will have important impacts. Generally, some parts of the Chinese ruling 
elite seem to favour international cooperation more than others; different actors involved in 
China’s development projects might have different degrees of interest in cooperating with the 
EU and other traditional donors. The outcome of this internal strive for influence is not yet 
clear, but will determine much of China’s external policy. The European Union, for its part, 
will have to deliver on her reform projects in order to (re-)gain credibility. The EU can, for 
instance, hardly expect China to harmonize its policies with traditional donors, if harmonisa-
tion cannot be achieved among EU member states and the Commission. The EU will also 
have to be clearer about its own interest in promoting cooperation and dialogue with China 
and Africa. 
Prospects for cooperation will further depend on the structure of the international aid system 
and the fora it provides. The comparison of the EU and China’s conceptions of development 
policy has demonstrated that, for the time being, there are few common notions and concepts. 
It would be necessary to build and/or strengthen international fora, ideally under the umbrella 
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of the United Nations, in which all actors (including African states) are represented. In 2007, 
the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) was launched as a platform that feeds into inter-
national negotiations, such as the Conference on Financing for Development. This is a first 
step in bringing developing countries, “new donors” and traditional donors together. The DCF 
will have to shift to discussions about jointly agreed definitions of development aid and com-
mon standards, in order to avoid becoming yet another ‘talk shop’. 
A great deal – if not all – will depend on how African countries approach these matters. China 
will not engage and participate in the international aid system, if African countries do not 
push for China’s involvement, whereas criticism from the African side of some development-
unfriendly practices of Chinese actors could probably have an important impact. These critics 
are most likely to be found amongst actors with comparable value systems than European 
actors, i.e. African states with democratic systems of governance and (sub)regional organisa-
tions with an explicit “good governance” agenda like NEPAD and the African Union, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or others. 
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1 Introduction 
Aid to developing countries has increased from countries such as China, Korea, Brazil, Vene-
zuela, or the Arab states in times when the international aid system is undergoing important 
reforms, aiming at increasing aid effectiveness1 and achieving implementation. These “new” 
donors2 provide their development assistance outside the framework of established interna-
tional structures: they have different concepts of development policy, use different approaches 
in their cooperation with developing countries and to a large extent do not integrate the inter-
national reform agenda in providing development aid (Woods 2008; Kragelund 2008). These 
new emerging players will strongly affect international debates on development and how aid 
is distributed. At the core of this debate lies China’s engagement in Africa, the consequences 
of China’s involvement for African development and for European development policy in 
Africa. 
The African continent is a main target region for “traditional” donors’3 development policy. 
Many challenges like the reduction of poverty, most other objectives of the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) and improvements in governance are particularly pressing in Af-
rica. In this regard, China and other non-OECD donors’ engagement is important to all tradi-
tional donors. However, from a European perspective China’s engagement is particularly 
relevant since Africa is the most important region for European development policy. Further-
more, the EU as a whole is by far the biggest provider of development assistance for Africa. 
In addition, the continent plays a particular role in the development of European foreign pol-
icy (cf. Grimm 2009). 
European and African perceptions of China’s engagement in Africa  
The discussion which has evolved during the last years in Europe is “changing from criticism 
with marvel and helpless reaction towards cooperative pragmatism” (Berger / Wissenbach 
2007, 3). Whereas some European critics argue that China’s policy is challenging and under-
mining the OECD consensus on conditions and standards attached to development policy, 
since China does not apply internationally agreed commitments while providing aid. Others 
see China’s policies more positively as catalysers of overdue change in European post-
colonial and charity-based attitudes, triggering also a debate of what development is and the 
best ways of achieving it. In this sense, China has become “a factor and accelerator in Euro-
pean considerations about reorienting the EU-Africa Partnership”, and although China has not 
triggered this debate it “gave it new impetus” (Berger / Wissenbach 2007, 4). 
A particularly sensitive and relevant issue in the debate might be the question of good govern-
ance and democracy. China cooperates with regimes that the EU and other donors would iso-
late for political reasons. China’s willingness to foster its policy of ‘no conditions’ is chal-
                                                 
1  The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in 2005, is one cornerstone of the international discus-
sions on aid effectiveness. Refer also to Chapter 2 in this discussion paper (see Box 1).  
2  The term “new donors” can be misleading since some of these new donors have a long tradition of providing 
development assistance. China, for instance, already gave aid to Africa in the 1950s. During the last years, 
however, China – and others – have substantially increased their aid to other developing countries. Other 
terms that are used are “emerging donors” or “non-DAC donors”, as these countries are not members of the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
3  Donors that coordinate their standards in the OECD/DAC are called “traditional donors”.  
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lenging the international consensus on governance and development. This raises the question 
to what extent China’s policies undercut European and African endeavours for promoting 
human rights, democracy and good governance. Particularly, NGOs are now fearing that their 
achievements in convincing Western governments and corporations in respecting principles of 
transparency and good governance might be put into question (Alden 2007, 111). 
African perceptions of China’s engagement are also quite diverse and diverging. African gov-
ernments mostly welcome China’s engagement in Africa since it provides greater freedom 
and independence from Western donors. Several rulers, such as Uganda’s President 
Museveni, explicitly highlight the greater policy space China offers (Brunell 2006). In Afri-
can civil societies, however, perceptions are more mixed. Discussions involve the question to 
what extent and under which conditions Africa can benefit from China’s engagement, regard-
less of China’s own interests and intentions. For instance, labour unions, environmental or 
human rights groups are concerned about China’s policies. Others, however, highlight possi-
ble benefits of China’s engagement for African development. They also underline the possi-
bilities of learning from Chinese experiences in poverty reduction and from the Chinese eco-
nomic development model. Some civil society networks, such as Fahamu have been particu-
larly active in the debate and also African researchers (particularly from South Africa) are 
working on this issue (Le Pere / Shelton 2007). 
Cooperation between EU, China and Africa remaining currently on the level of dialogue 
China’s engagement in Africa has caused different initiatives throughout the EU. Until now, 
however, the European Commission and EU Member States have barely coordinated their 
respective activities and it is unclear to what extent different initiatives complement each 
other. At the European level, discussions with Chinese leadership were launched as part of the 
framework of the EU-China strategic partnership. The first joint statement, made during the 
EU-China summit in September 2006 in Helsinki, highlighted that both sides are committed 
to work together in favour of peace, stability and sustainable development in Africa. Despite 
this broad agreement, divergent views on the relations with Africa were communicated: 
“The EU reaffirmed its attachment to the principles of good governance and human 
rights, as embodied in its Africa strategy. The Chinese side emphasized the upholding of 
the five principles of peaceful coexistence, in particular the principle of non-interference 
into others’ internal affairs.” (Council of the European Union 2006) 
Since then, the European Commission has been particularly active in pushing for a more 
comprehensive and intense dialogue with the Chinese government on European and Chinese 
policies in Africa. In parallel, various EU Member States have launched dialogue initiatives 
independently from each other. The UK Department for International Development (DfID) 
has to some extent taken the role of a precursor, proceeding an active policy of constructive 
engagement and holding, among others, a regular dialogue with Chinese officials. Initiatives – 
albeit more reluctant – have also been taken by the French government; the Swedish Devel-
opment Agency (SIDA) is interested in the question a great deal; and also the German gov-
ernment has become increasingly active in this matter. Whereas first discussions mostly 
started as a bilateral meeting between China and the EU, meanwhile there have been attempts 
to broaden them and to integrate African countries. In October 2008, the EU Commission 
took the lead in fostering trilateral dialogue mechanisms, publishing a communication on 
“The EU, China and Africa: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation” (European Com-
mission 2008b). 
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The attitude of Chinese officials towards European dialogue initiatives is changing. At first, 
reactions were quite hesitant. However, an increasing interest in communication and exchange 
on certain issues is noticeable. Many Chinese scholars are particularly interested in coopera-
tion and exchange with European scholars. African governments for their part regard bilateral 
EU-China contacts often with suspicions, fearing that the EU and China could coordinate ef-
forts without taking African interests into account. At the same time, African initiatives and 
attempts to influence the dialogue between the EU and China have been marginal as well as 
the trilateral activities; reactions on the political level remained rather anecdotic. This can 
partly be explained by a lack of African governments’ (and African regional organisations) 
capacities in formulating a common position or a common response strategy towards China’s 
Africa policy or towards dialogues between the EU and China on Africa. 
Cooperation, competition or conflict between the EU and China: what consequences are 
there for development in Africa? 4 
These recent initiatives in fostering cooperation mainly take place on the dialogue level. For 
the medium and long-term these initiatives aim at creating more comprehensive cooperation 
in order to reduce competition and conflict between European and Chinese development poli-
cies in regard to their external relations. From an aid effectiveness perspective, cooperation, 
competition and conflict between European and Chinese development policies on Africa 
could each entail positive and negative consequences for development in Africa (see Box 1 
below).  
Arguably, the role of African countries will depend to a large extent if cooperation, competi-
tion or conflict between European and Chinese development policies will be beneficial for 
development in Africa. Only if African countries take ownership and actively shape their rela-
tionship with fund providers, external engagement is likely to have positive consequences for 
development.5  
In line with the argumentation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see Box 2), co-
operation between Europe and China in the area of development policy could entail positive 
consequences for African development. This could happen if African ownership is respected 
and if both sides align with the priorities and strategies of the partner country. It can be ex-
pected that cooperation would then, for instance, contribute to avoiding duplication of efforts 
and exchanging experiences in order to find best practices (see also European Commission 
2008b). In contrast, cooperation between the EU and China could have negative effects for 
African development, if it would ignore African ownership. Cooperation “at all costs” could 
have negative consequences for development, if the EU had to compromise on core norms, 
principles and values. 
Also, competition between European and Chinese development policies could have positive 
effects on African development, as long as Europe and China align their policies with African  
 
                                                 
4  The author would like to thank Dr. Guido Ashoff for his valuable comments on this part. 
5  The role and perspective of African countries has deliberately been left out in this paper, as it focuses on 
policy approaches of European and Chinese actors only.  
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Box 1: EU-China relations with Africa: examples of consequences for African development
 Positive aspects for African de-
velopment 
Negative aspects for African devel-
opment 
Cooperation If harmonisation takes place, taking 
into account the priorities and strate-
gies of African partners 
If “ganging up” against African partners 
without respecting alignment and owner-
ship takes place 
Competition If partner priorities are respected, 
competition for best concepts and 
approaches in project process im-
plementation can be beneficial for 
African development 
If donors compete in the tendering 
process, using the country’s pro-
curement systems 
If work and resources are duplicated 
If competition leads to a “race to the bot-
tom” for standards and norms 
Conflict If differences with regard to norms, 
standards and principles are not cov-
ered; but if, instead, they are openly 
discussed and carried out 
If both sides work against each other 
If development policies are instrumental-
ised by opposing foreign policy or eco-
nomic interests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
priorities and strategies. Competition for best practises, for instance with regard to project 
implementation, could enhance the effectiveness of development aid. In the light of competi-
tion from Chinese development aid, the EU and other Western donors could feel more pres-
sure to consequently implement and deliver on reforms they have committed themselves to. 
China, on its part, could be pushed to reform aspects of its development policy that have been 
criticised by African countries (e.g. poor evaluation of aid projects and problems with the 
sustainability of projects). Without respecting ownership and without aligning with African 
strategies, competition could, however, also have negative effects on development, since re-
sources and costs of development policy could be duplicated. Competition could also lead to a 
“race to the bottom” with regard to achieved standards and principles of international devel-
opment cooperation. 
Conflict between European and Chinese development policies could have positive conse-
quences when these discussions contribute in improving development policies on both sides 
and are discussed openly, for instance, if disputes arise regarding diverging norms, standards 
or principles. In contrast, if conflict between European and Chinese development policies 
implies that both sides simply work against each other and if development policy would be 
highly succumbed by foreign policy and economic interests, conflict between European and 
Chinese policies could have negative affects on African development. 
For the time being, it is unclear to what extent it will be possible to expand the existing dia-
logue mechanisms and to translate them into concrete cooperation projects between the EU, 
China and African countries. Or, to which degree the relationship between European and Chi-
nese Africa policies will be rather characterised by competition or even conflict and what 
consequences this would precisely have for African development. The objective of this paper 
is, therefore, to identify aspects and elements of European and Chinese policy approaches 
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towards Africa that will possibly influence the structure of the future relationship between 
European and Chinese development policies in Africa. 
China and the EU’s engagement in Africa: what are the prospects for cooperation, 
competition or conflict? 
Different theoretical schools identify different reasons for countries to provide development 
aid to poorer countries and they predict different scenarios with regard to the prospects for 
cooperation, competition and conflict between international actors. In this respect, they iden-
tify different aspects that could influence the future relationship between European and Chi-
nese development policies on Africa in regard to their external relations. 
Realists and neo-realists mostly adopt a pessimistic position on the possibilities of peaceful 
integration of new powerful actors in existing international structures. Power balancing and 
transition of power theorists argue from a zero-sum perspective: one countries gain in power 
is the other one’s loss in power. In the persistence of anarchy in the international system, it 
will thus be difficult for traditional major actors to accept the emergence of a new player in 
the international system, since this puts their influence and power into question. New players, 
on the contrary, will almost inevitably challenge existing international institutions, power dis-
tributions and norms (cf. Waltz 1979). From this perspective, conflict between traditional 
players and new-comers is almost inevitable; a peaceful and cooperative integration of China 
in the existing structures consequently would be difficult (Mearsheimer 2006). 
As realists and neo-realists put power and national interests at the centre of their theories, de-
velopment policy is mostly perceived as a foreign policy instruments, aiming at pursuing se-
curity interests, safeguarding access to natural resources and promoting economic interests 
(Morgenthau 1962). From a realist point of view, it could therefore be expected that the rela-
tion between Chinese and European policies in Africa would be rather characterised by com-
petition and conflict over resources and economic interests. In this respect, development pol-
icy would become an increasingly important instrument for both sides in order to safeguard 
their respective economic and resource interests. Within this scenario, cooperation between 
the EU and China in the field of development policy seems to be rather unlikely. 
(Neo-)institutionalists and liberalists, on the contrary, highlight that in the age of globalisa-
tion, international relations are increasingly interdependent. Increasing global diffusions of 
trade, production, communication and financial flows as well as global challenges like climate 
change encourage competing powers to enhance cooperation and pursue mutual gains. Nation 
states therefore are increasingly integrated and embedded in tied structures and networks, fa-
cilitating the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Gu / Humphrey / Messner 2007). 
Liberal theories particularly highlight that states can not be taken as closed units. Instead, the 
domestic institutional setting and domestic actor constellations influence foreign policy mak-
ing of national governments and shape foreign policy preferences of governments (cf. Mo-
ravcsik 1997). Therefore, development policy is shaped by the preferences of national actors 
and their power and influence on the national policy-making process.  
From these perspectives, the emergence of China as an increasingly important actor in Africa 
might not necessarily result in competition and conflict with European policies on Africa. 
Under certain conditions, instead, cooperation could be possible. According to institutionalist 
theories, the existence of institutions and the interaction of actors within these institutions 
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could induce learning processes which will facilitate cooperation among different actors 
(Humphrey / Messner 2006). Among others, the future character of the relation between 
European and Chinese policies on Africa would thus depend on already existing international 
institutions and their capacities to structure debates and create norms and rules. In addition, 
the interests of the domestic actors involved in development policy-making in the EU and in 
China, their power and their capacities to bring their preferences into the decision-making 
process would influence the relation between Chinese and European policies in Africa. Coop-
eration is conceivable if there is a certain intersection of preferences between these actors. 
The prospects for cooperation between the EU and China in the field of development policy 
would, therefore, depend on the actor constellations within the EU and China. 
Other theoretical schools spotlight the importance of norms, identities, values and belief sys-
tems for the relation between international actors. From this perspective, different perceptions 
of the nature of international relations strongly impact on policy decisions of decision-makers. 
From this point of view, development policy is strongly influenced by the ideals of justice, 
charity, solidarity and – to some degree – Christian mission. Subjective factors such as strate-
gic cultures, belief systems and interests are transmitted by learning processes and are embed-
ded in historical experiences. These underlying subjective perceptions tend to be highly resis-
tant to change. They can be modified, however, through the interaction with other actors, 
since these interactions can bring up new ideas and information which can contribute to re-
placing earlier perceptions (cf. Wendt 1992; Friedberg 2005, 34).  
Optimistic constructivists highlight that China’s participation in international institutions 
could lead to modifications and adaptation of its strategic culture, and would imply changes in 
its underlying belief systems and interests. Increasing contacts and exchanges between Chi-
nese and European actors could thus trigger modifications of identities, strategic cultures and 
norms on both sides, thereby successively facilitating cooperation in Chinese and European 
policies towards Africa (cf. Johnston 1995). More pessimistic constructivists, however, would 
argue that positive changes are long lasting processes, since mental constructs are deeply 
rooted. Differing and diverging identities among major actors could then lead to competition 
between actors and could even become a source of instabilities, triggering conflicting situa-
tions (cf. Friedberg 2005). 
Each of these theoretical schools captures different aspects of reality and identifies different 
causal mechanisms to be crucial. When it comes to reality, however, it can be expected that 
the future relationship between European and Chinese policies in Africa will be influenced by 
a mixture of these factors. Against this backdrop, this discussion paper will shed light on a 
broad range of aspects that could have an influence on the character of the future relationship 
between the EU and China’s development policies towards Africa in the context of their over-
all external relations. The aim of this paper is, thus, to analyse and compare the state of the art 
of Chinese and European policy approaches towards Africa in order to assess the prospects 
for future cooperation between both actors, and weigh them against the possibilities of com-
petition or conflict between both sides.  
Drawing from the outlined theoretical arguments, several elements could influence the future 
relations between European and Chinese development policies in Africa: policy objectives, 
values, norms and principles; the structure of interests on both sides; as well as the actors in-
volved in European and Chinese policies towards Africa. Consequently, the paper will first 
look at objectives and principles of European and Chinese development cooperation as they 
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are outlined in major policy documents in order to find out similarities and differences. Then, 
the paper assesses the interests of both sides and discusses the preferences and influences of 
major actors in the EU and China that could have an influence on development policy-
making. Besides, the paper casts a light on the current areas of Chinese and European devel-
opment cooperation with Africa in order to identify similarities and differences. 
2 The European approach: From traditional donor-recipient relations to 
a new strategic partnership with Africa? 
Africa is the most important region of engagement for European development policy – for the 
communitarised programmes led by the European Commission as well as for EU Member 
States and their national policies; Africa receives more than half of all EU ODA funds. The 
neighbouring continent also plays a particular role in the development of European foreign 
policy. Since the year 2000, the EU has been intensively reforming its overall development 
policy and its policy towards Africa. The objectives of these reform processes are multifac-
eted; the EU aims at strengthening its role as a global actor and as a central partner for the 
political and economic development in Africa. It arguably also aspires to reform the funda-
mental pattern of its relationship with Africa to overcome the traditional policy approach 
which conceived African countries often as junior partners. Instead, the EU aims at establish-
ing a strategic relationship, where it places itself politically on an equal footing with African 
regional and continental institutions such as the African Union (AU) and regional economic 
communities, for example, by naming just two: the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
2.1 Normatively guided principles, objectives and European interests 
Different reform processes at various levels have been affecting European development policy 
towards Africa since 2000. International reforms of development cooperation, the reform of 
European development policy in general as well as the reform of overall European policy to-
wards Africa need to be considered. 
First of all, objectives and principles of European development policy towards Africa are 
highly influenced by international agreements. Under the general objective of providing more 
effective aid, several reform initiatives have been carried out in the international aid system 
since 20006 (see Box 2) and the EU is politically committed to apply these multilaterally 
agreed principles and objectives in their own development policies. The European Commis-
sion and the EU Member States actively took part in elaborating these international agree-
ments, even though it has been argued that the EU “seems to be a norm-importer rather than a 
norm-exporter in development policy, and has only rarely […] been able to put a distinctive 
European stamp on the international development agenda” (Orbie / Versluys 2008, 85). 
                                                 
6  The UN Millennium Declaration and the MDGs (2000), the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Devel-
opment (2002) as well as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and its follow-up, the Accra 
Agenda for Action (2008), are particularly relevant in this respect. 
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Box 2: International development policy effectiveness agenda 
Dimension Relevant documents Major aspects 
1. Goals UN: Millennium Declaration and Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
signed in 2000 
EU: European Consensus (2005), valid 
for EU Commission and Member Sta-
tes 
Core objective:  
eradication of poverty 
EU designs its objectives in line 
with international objectives  
2. Resources UN: Monterrey Consensus on Financ-
ing (2002) and post-Monterrey con-
sensus (Doha Declaration on Financ-
ing for Development in 2008) 
EU: commitments on ODA targets 
(2005) 
0.7 percent ODA/GNI until 2015 
EU collectively: 0.56 percent 
ODA/GNI by 2010 to reach 0.7 
percent ODA/GNI in 2015 
3. Institutions UN: no commitment 
EU: EU Code of Conduct on Com-
plementarity and Division of Labour 
(2007) valid for EU Commission and 
Member States 
 
Aims at increasing coordination 
between EU actors: i.e. donor 
should limit aid to two focal areas 
4. Principles,  
procedures and 
modalities 
High level forum on aid effective-
ness: 
- Rome Declaration on Harmonisati-
on (2003) 
- Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-
ness (PD) (2005) 
- and follow up process – Accra 
Agenda for Action (2008) 
EU: European Consensus (2005) and 
EU Code of Conduct (2007)  
 
 
 
- core principles PD: ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation 
- commitments: predictability, 
conditionality, untying 
EU embraces principles of PD in 
its policy documents  
5. Policy coherence 
for development 
(PCD) 
Endorsed by OECD members at UN 
level 
EU: European Consensus  
Various dimensions: coherence 
within dev. policies, intra-
country, inter-donor, donor-
partner country 
6. Methodological 
dimension:  
assessing aid effec-
tiveness 
Paris Declaration Principles 4 (managing for re-
sults) and 5 (mutual accountabil-
ity) 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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In parallel to discussions at the international level, development policy at the European level 
has also been substantially reformed over the last years. European development policy, how-
ever, remains a shared competency between the European Commission and EU Member Sta-
tes. At the European level, the Development Policy Strategy (DPS) of November 2000 was 
the first strategic document which provided guidance for the development policy of the Euro-
pean Commission. This strategy has been revised and replaced by the European Consensus in 
2005, signed by the presidents of the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), 
the Council as well as the 25 EU Member States. Though as a political declaration not legally 
binding, the consensus outlines for the first time a common vision and principles of develop-
ment policy that apply for the European institutions as well as for the Member States (Grimm 
/ Bergh / Freres 2005). In addition, in 2007 a European Code of Conduct on Complementarity 
and Division of Labour has been elaborated by the Commission and adopted by the Council 
(European Commission 2007c). Both documents are considered to indicate “a more real 
change of course” – if not a “silent revolution” (like the Paris Agenda), since they now pro-
vide a commonly agreed framework for enhanced coordination between Member States and 
the Commission and commit both to common conceptions and views on development policy 
(Carbone 2007; Grimm 2008b). 
Besides these reforms in the field of development policy, Europe’s broader policy framework 
towards Africa has also been fundamentally revised throughout the last years. Since 2000, 
Africa (re)-occurred on the European agenda for several reasons: after 11 September 2001, 
the nexus between security and development became more apparent (cf. Gänzle 2009). In 
addition, inner-African developments such as the foundation of the New Partnership for Afri-
can Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the African Union (AU) in 2002, the emergence of 
new actors in Africa such as China (and, to a lesser degree, also India and others) as well as 
the growing focus on natural and energy resources put Africa back on the European agenda 
(Kotsopoulos 2007; Kotsopoulos / Sidiropoulos 2007). The EU Africa strategy, published by 
the Commission in 2005, is an expression of this growing attention. This strategy is also the 
first regional policy paper, which implements the European consensus. 
The EU aspires to combine and use its broad mandate in different policy areas more effec-
tively in order to make a contribution to global development. One of the major objectives of 
the EU Africa strategy is, therefore, to overcome the strong fragmentation of European poli-
cies towards Africa in order to increase coherence between different policy fields and enhance 
coordination between different actors at the national and European level. European policy 
towards Africa is split between different policy areas, such as trade, foreign policy and devel-
opment policy, each having different degrees and levels of integration. The Africa strategy, 
therefore, seeks to create an overarching umbrella, regrouping different European policies. In 
addition, the strategy – as an EU paper, instead of a Commission paper – embraces Member 
States’ bilateral development policies. And it aims at embracing different regional agreements 
(European Commission 2005a), as the EU’s Africa policy is traditionally segmented across 
the continent, being based on different treaties with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
group, the North-African countries in Europe’s Neighbourhood policy as well as a separate 
agreement with South Africa. The strategy was further published in the hope that a summit 
meeting between the European and African heads of state could be organised in Lisbon as 
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soon as possible, as in 2005 the Africa-EU summit was pending for two years already7 
(Grimm 2007). This has formally been achieved: negotiations on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
started in 2007 and were completed during the EU-Africa summit in December 2007 in Lis-
bon. Although several elements have been criticised, the summit and the Joint Strategy as a 
whole are considered to heighten expectations and to create an atmosphere of departure in 
EU-African relations (Kotsopoulos / Sidiropoulos 2007). 
Major objectives of European development policy in Africa 
Embracing internationally agreed principles and objectives, the core objectives of European 
development policy towards Africa are the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable 
development and the achievement of the MDGs, among others through the increase of the 
amount of aid to 0.7 percent of GNI by 2015. The European consensus refers to the MDGs as 
its goal system without specifying how the EU wants to contribute to their achievement. In 
contrast, the EU Africa strategy further outlines and details how the EU precisely wants to 
contribute to their achievement in Africa. Until the 1980s, democracy and human rights were 
rather perceived as the outcome of a successful social and economic modernisation process. 
Since then, they are considered to be also pre-conditions for development (Grimm 2003). 
Consequently, the EU also presents the prevalence of peace and security, good governance, 
fundamental freedoms and human rights as well as promising economic environment as pre-
conditions for the reduction of poverty and for development in general.8 Thus, the EU policy 
is well placed in the international mainstream of the concept of sustainable and comprehen-
sive human and social development. In this context, the EU Africa strategy refers to common 
values and shared principles that form the basis of international cooperation between the EU 
and Africa. In compliance with the Paris Declaration, the EU seeks to increase the coordina-
tion, complementarity and coherence between different policy fields and actors in order to 
enhance the overall effectiveness of its aid programmes (Grimm / Kielwein 2005). 
Beyond development in a narrow sense, the EU Security Strategy is providing a guiding 
document for EU institutions and Member States. As laid down in the Security Strategy, the 
EU in its relations with Africa also aims at promoting effective multilateralism in the frame-
work of UN institutions (European Council 2003). It aspires to tackle global challenges – of 
which poverty is explicitly included – jointly with African countries. The Joint Africa-EU 
strategy is arguably a continuation of these aspirations and picks up on values and goals for-
mulated in EU documents. 
Key principles of European development policy 
As outlined in the relevant policy documents above, the major principles of European devel-
opment policy towards Africa are ownership, partnership, equality and solidarity. Further-
more, political dialogue is used in order to enhance democracy, good governance and human 
                                                 
7  The first Africa-EU summit took place in 2000 in Cairo. It was agreed to hold a summit every three years, 
but due to conflicting views about the participation of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, no summit could be 
held in 2003 and thereafter. Interestingly, it was only after the Beijing Africa-China summit (FOCAC) in 
November 2006 that Europeans moved on their strict line of applying the travel ban to Zimbabwe’s Presi-
dent.  
8  This linkage is made similarly in base documents of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NE-
PAD) (cf. Grimm et al. 2009a). 
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rights as well as the broadening of the participation of the civil society, promoting gender 
equality and addressing state fragility.  
Embedded in the semantic field of partnership, participation, empowerment and sustainability, 
the principle of ownership became a Leitmotiv in the international development policy dis-
course – also integrated into the European context. Past experience shows that reform agendas 
imposed on African states by donor countries faced implementation problems. This was, 
among others, due to a lack of acceptance and support in the recipient country (Collier et al. 
1997). Against this backdrop, the idea of ownership implies that the primary responsibility for 
creating an enabling domestic environment for improving development lies in the responsibil-
ity of the partner countries. The EU – similar to other DAC donors – commits itself to sup-
porting these strategies and national development plans of the partner countries (Schmitz 
2006). The aid modality of general or sectoral budget support is seen by the EU as a helpful 
mean for enhancing ownership and alignment with the partner country’s priorities. In addi-
tion, the African Union shall become the main interlocutor of the EU in order to enhance Af-
rican ownership. This provides a broader perspective, but does not automatically solve ques-
tions about the AU’s current capabilities to fulfil this role (FES 2006). 
However, implementing the principle of ownership requires that donors accept the priorities 
set by partner countries as the right choice. In its most far-reaching form, this might go as far 
as renouncing own interests which are connected to development projects (Brüne 2007). In 
addition, the ideas of ownership and partnership – if understood as a government-to-
government cooperation – may conflict with other European objectives such as promoting 
democracy and human rights; while emphasising the principle of ownership, the EU entails at 
the same time political concepts that will have far-reaching impacts on the political and social 
structure of the partner country. Thus, ownership is understood as ‘national ownership’, i.e. 
going beyond government only. From the perspective of donor governments, shifting the 
main focus from (negative) conditionalities towards ownership and partnership further implies 
a renouncement on tight donor control or micro-management, which could create difficulties 
with regard to the accountability of donor governments vis-à-vis their home constituents 
(Molina 2007). 
The principles of equality and partnership point to the idea that the EU not only aims at being 
a partner in development cooperation, but also seeks to become an economic and political 
partner of African countries. The ideal of a relationship based on equal partnership has been 
promoted since the creation of the Lomé agreements in the mid-1970s. However, these norms 
had taken a back-seat in the light of the promotion and accentuation of norms such as democ-
ratisation and political and economic liberalisation, introduced after the end of the Cold War 
(Grimm 2003).  
Respect for democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights 
The Maastricht treaty – legal basis of EU common foreign and security policy as well as for 
common development policy – integrated the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as fundamental objectives of European foreign relations in 
general (Art. 11 TEU) and as an important objective of European development policy in par-
ticular (Art. 177). The promotion of values and norms thus represents an integral part of the 
self-conception of the EU as a normative or civil power (Scheipers / Sicurelli 2008; Manners 
2002). In the relations with ACP countries a political element has been introduced for the first 
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time in the Lomé IV agreement in 1989, including provisions on human rights, democracy 
and rule of law. This political dimension has been extended during the mid-term review of 
Lomé IV in 1995, upgrading them to – ‘essential elements’9 – of the treaty. Also the respect 
of good governance has been mentioned for the first time. In 2000, the Cotonou convention 
further inserted a new consultation procedure to be able to deal with violations at an early 
stage (Crawford 2007; Beck / Conzelmann 2004; Börzel / Risse 2007).  
It has, however, been argued that since the beginning of the 1990s the EU has lacked a serious 
commitment with regard to implementing these principles. Promoting democracy and human 
rights has often been short of self-interests of certain Member States (particularly France) and 
has often been tempered by security issues (Olsen 1998; Brown 2005). Critics point out that 
the EU is particularly reluctant “to push on democratic governance in many (oil) producer 
states that remain authoritarian and marred by deep internal poverty”, such as Angola or Chad 
(Hadfield / Youngs 2008). After several attempts to apply sanctions with rather mixed results 
and negative experiences with (negative) conditionalities, the EU re-emphasised the principle 
of partnership with a revision of the Cotonou treaty in 2005. The EU commits itself to support 
all ACP countries, regardless of their political regimes, but requires respect for fundamental 
human rights. The EU seeks to convince partner countries through an intensive political dia-
logue and concrete incentive structures to increase the partner country’s own engagement to 
improve human rights records, democracy and good governance (Molt 2007). 
The EU attaches high importance to political dialogue.10 The EU Africa strategy integrates 
already existing dialogues with various African countries, at different levels.11 Political dia-
logue is regarded as a specific form of diplomacy and a specific instrument by which the 
European Union aims to elaborate cooperative structures. This will then contribute to short 
and long-term peaceful reconcilement of interests, prevent conflicts and it addresses questions 
of democracy, rule of law and human rights (Schukraft 2007). However, in light of these dif-
ferent dialogues, which partly overlap, it is necessary to clarify their respective importance 
and relationship, particularly with regard to the ACP-EU political dialogue and the discus-
sions at continental level. 
European interests in Africa 
At the end of the Cold War, European interests in Africa had generally declined, since African 
countries lost their strategic role as potential allies against the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
Africa’s economic situation was not promising enough for it to become a major trading part-
ner for the EU and thereby replacing geo-strategic importance for economic interests. Norms 
                                                 
9  The “essential element” clause refers to the Vienna Convention for international agreements. In case that 
one side of the contracting parties perceives that these “essential elements” have been violated, it can inter-
rupt or even stop the cooperation. In the Cotonou Convention, the respect of democracy, human right and 
rule of law are “essential elements”. In contrast, the respect of good governance has only been introduced as 
a “fundamental element” (Conzelmann 2003; Beck / Conzelmann 2004). 
10  This is also illustrated by the new “Governance Incentive Tranche” that has been introduced by the Euro-
pean Commission in 2006 (Molenaers / Nijs 2008). 
11  The political dialogue with the ACP countries, introduced at the Cotonou convention in 2000, the dialogue 
with the North African countries in the context of the neighbourhood policy, the dialogue with South Africa 
in the context of the strategic partnership as well as the dialogue with the African continent as a whole, 
which has been launched in Cairo in 2000. 
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and values in European cooperation with Africa were, therefore, able to gain importance 
(throughout) in the 1990s. And, political principles, such as the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and good governance figured more prominent on the European agenda. Even 
though European security, migration or resource interests continued to play a role, arguably a 
narrow understanding of self-interests would not be sufficient to explain the overall and rather 
broad engagement of the EU (i.e. Commission and numerous Member States) in many Afri-
can countries. In particular, the European engagement in states that are small and strategically 
not important could not sufficiently be explained with a narrow understanding of self-interests 
(Grimm 2003). 
Security interests, migration, global challenges 
At present, European external relations interests in Africa are predominantly formed by secu-
rity interests, migration as well as global challenges, such as climate change or terrorism. In 
the light of the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, international terrorism is identified in the 
European Security Strategy as a key threat for European security and ‘concerted European 
action is indispensable’ (European Council 2003). Researchers and politicians have often re-
ferred to the close linkage between failed states and terrorism. It is argued that in a situation 
of lawlessness and anarchy, terrorists would easily find areas of retreat, enabling them to pre-
pare new attacks. According to the Failed States Index 2007, 14 out of 20 of the weakest 
states are located in Africa.12 Hence, the stabilisation of these states is an important topic for 
the EU (Nuscheler 2007; Schmidt 2007). Stabilising failed states is also one major objective 
of the European Africa strategy.  
Yet, European interests in cooperation with African countries are less directly involved with 
issues concerning climate change. Africa is not a major contributor to climate change itself, 
since it accounts for only 2.3 percent of global CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, the African con-
tinent is highly vulnerable to climate change (Scholz / Bauer 2007). In this respect, Europe 
will be affected indirectly and particularly in terms of migration pressure from North Africa: 
“Since the EU’s neighbours include some of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, 
e.g. North Africa and the Middle East, migratory pressure at the European Union’s borders 
and political instability and conflicts could increase in the future. This could also have a sig-
nificant impact on Europe’s energy supply routes” (High Representative / European Commis-
sion 2008). Consequences of climate change will further add to already existing push factors 
for migration, such as conflicts, human rights violations, poverty, the general degradation of 
national resources and demographic pressures.  
At the same time, the expectation of having a better life in Europe constitutes an important 
pull factor. The extent of African migration to the EU has risen considerably in recent years, 
even though the majority of people still migrate within the African continent. Migratory pres-
sure from sub-Saharan Africa has already been felt in North Africa, namely Libya and Mo-
rocco, which serve as stations on the way to Europe. For this reason pressure on resources in 
North Africa are increasing even further. Estimates indicate that eight million irregular mi-
grants currently live in the EU, most of them in Southern European countries. Some experts 
assume that in the medium and long-term perspective the migration flows from Africa to the 
EU could even evolve into one of the largest in world history. However, Europe shares an 
                                                 
12  See: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=7 
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important responsibility for the underlying factors, which are generating and fuelling migra-
tion: European governments have often supported corrupt African regimes, not only during 
the colonial period, but also in the Cold War context. In addition, the European foreign trade 
policy also contributes partly to reducing prospects for development in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Kohnert 2008). 
European resource and economic interests in Africa 
In the light of sharply rising international demand for natural resources, particularly for oil 
and gas, the African continent is often said to experience a ‘geo-strategic renaissance’ and the 
concern was raised if the continent would become the stage of a new ‘scramble for Africa’s 
resources’ (Melber 2007). The African continent is currently not a major source for European 
energy security. European oil and gas imports are highly concentrated, coming mainly from 
Russia, Norway and the Middle East. Northern Africa accounts only for 12 percent of oil im-
ports. Gas imports from Africa are more important in this respect: Algeria provides 20 percent 
of all European imports (European Commission 2008c).  
While global competition is accelerating and gas and oil resources in the EU itself are declin-
ing, the importance of Africa as an energy provider may increase in the future. The EU is al-
ready one of the largest importers of energy worldwide, since EU Member States consume 
significantly more energy than they produce. Therefore, the EU is highly dependent on im-
ports, particularly on oil and natural gas. Energy dependency in 2005 already exceeded 52 
percent, with a particularly high share of import dependency on oil of about 82 percent. 
Europe’s energy import dependency is likely to further increase within the next years, up to 
65 percent in 2030 (European Commission 2007a; European Commission 2008c). The Euro-
pean Security Strategy identifies energy security as one of the major concerns of the EU. In 
this respect, the European Commission and the Council have also highlighted the need to di-
versify energy sources and routes of transport in order to reduce dependency.  
Consequently, the importance of Africa’s resources and commodities for European economies 
is increasingly being acknowledged: In the Joint EU-Africa strategy, both sides agree to build 
up an Energy Partnership in order to address joint challenges of energy security, diversifica-
tion of supply and the sustainable management of energy resources (Africa-EU Joint Strategy 
2007). The EU Commission’s Communication on European Energy Policy further states that 
“the importance of Africa as an energy supplier has increased greatly in recent years, but its 
potential is still greater” (European Commission 2007a). 
For the time being, overall European economic interests in Africa can be considered as lim-
ited. During the last years, the economic situation in African countries generally improved. 
Several countries experienced high growth rates, partly due to international high energy 
prices. In 2007, Africa’s economy grew by about 6.5 percent (Kohnert 2008). If this growth 
could be sustained and purchasing power of African populations grows, this could have direct 
consequences for Africa’s economic importance for the EU. However, although the EU con-
stitutes the largest trading partner for most African countries, Africa only counts for nine per-
cent of EU imports, half of which are energy products. African countries absorb about 8 per-
cent of European exports (European Commission 2007b). With regard to economic interests 
beyond energy, Commissioner Louis Michel in the context of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) declared that “The EU has no offensive interests [in Africa]” (Michel 
2008). This statement implied that EPAs are meant to support development in Africa and are 
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not negotiated in order to promote European interests (cf. Makhan 2009 forthcoming). While 
Europe’s trade and investment share with Africa is declining, experts estimate that China 
could soon replace the EU as Africa’s main trading partner and would become one of the big-
gest investors on the continent. European investors are generally rather reluctant to invest in 
Africa, considering political risks and an unfavourable investment climate. 
European global political interests 
The political interests of the EU in Africa are often closely linked to and driven by its global 
role more generally. The EU seeks to increase and forge its own role as an important actor in 
international relations. Reforms in European development policy and European policy to-
wards Africa in general are not only aimed at making both policies more effective in order to 
increase the benefits of European aid for development in Africa, but also establishing the EU 
as an international actor (Arts / Dickson 2004; Molt 2007).  
The EU wants to establish ‘effective multilateralism’ in international affairs, in order to im-
prove the international legal system and promote the values it considers to be universally im-
portant such as democracy, social welfare, human rights and political liberalism. African 
countries are important partners in this respect, since they share European values and norms to 
some extent, as laid down in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Recent studies on voting patterns 
in UN human rights bodies, however, seem to indicate that the European Union’s influence in 
international organisations is declining (Gowan / Brantner 2008). When voting on human 
rights issues in the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Secu-
rity Council, the EU currently enjoys considerably less support than during the 1990s. This is 
partly due to the fact that China and also Russia form new ‘poles of attraction’. They are able 
to mobilize the support of ‘swing voters’; these are often many African states (Gowan / 
Brantner 2008). 
Preliminary results: European policy towards Africa under reform 
European development policy and overall European policy towards Africa underwent an im-
portant reform process throughout the last years. Reforms at the European level, including 
clarification of goals and principles, were strongly embedded in international initiatives aim-
ing at increasing the effectiveness of development aid. The objective of these reforms on the 
one hand aspires for greater aid effectiveness. On the other hand, it aims at fostering the EU’s 
role as a global actor. One major objective of European reforms is the integration of different 
policy areas in order to overcome the fragmentation between development policy and other 
policy fields; objectives of development policy shall be increasingly mainstreamed in other 
policy areas.  
At this stage the EU is implementing new strategies and policy documents. Much of the future 
success of European development policy towards Africa will, therefore, depend on the ability 
and pace of the EU to translate the existing policy documents into concrete activities, as its 
credibility as an actor depends on delivering targets and achieving goals.  
Since the end of the Cold War and in the light of the declining economic and strategic impor-
tance of Africa, the promotion of values and norms in the European-African relationship has 
become more important. However, it is necessary to note that the promotion of human rights 
and democracy became more prominent against the background of decreasing economic and 
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security interests. For the time being, it is not clear to what extent resource or economic inter-
est could regain importance and thus to which degree they would foster Africa’s geo-strategic 
importance for Europe. In addition, principles like good governance and democracy have not 
been promoted in an equal and consistent measure by all EU Member States and vis-à-vis all 
African partner countries. Also, principles of European development policy – as for all donors 
– do not come without internal discrepancies, as the tension between the principle of owner-
ship and the promotion of democracy and human rights has illustrated. 
2.2 Multitude of state and non-state actors: seeking coherence in European 
development policy 
According to the OECD definition of ODA, aid has to be provided by the public sector in 
order to be registered as ODA.13 Pivotal actors in European development policy are state ac-
tors providing European development assistance, even though the EU introduced and further 
increased the participation of non-state actors with the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. 
State actors in the European system of multi-level governance 
Accounting for almost 60 percent of the international aid provided by the members of the 
DAC in 2007, the EU is the largest collective donor – or rather: donor system – worldwide. 
Although the EU is apparently a high performer with regard to quantity, the ability of the EU 
to act as a unified actor are considered to be comparatively low and the EU as a whole had 
long-time rather limited influence on the course of the international debate on development, 
although the EU seems to be developing more into a norm-setter in its own right (Orbie / 
Versluys 2008, 68). The shortcomings are mainly explained with the high degree of internal 
fragmentation (Carbone 2007). As outlined above, different reform initiatives since 2000 
aimed at addressing this problem. However, different state actors with different responsibili-
ties and interests at the national and the European level are still involved in European devel-
opment policy towards Africa. Their relationship and interactions are very much defining 
Europe’s overall development policy towards Africa and this mixed system can lead to a 
cumbersome bargaining process amongst actors in which short-term national goals can prevail 
over Community values and goals (Arts / Dickson 2004). 
The European Commission 
At the European level, the Commission and the Council are the key actors in European devel-
opment policy-making towards Africa. The role and the self-perception of the Commission 
have changed since the mid-1990s, mainly due to growing competencies of the Commission 
in the area of development policy. At present, it perceives itself more as a political actor, de-
signing and framing political processes, rather than merely implementing political decisions 
(Schukraft 2007). It has often been argued that the European Commission is a comparatively 
                                                 
13  According to the definition of Official Development Assistance: “flows to developing countries and multi-
lateral institutions provided by official agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: a) it is 
administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its 
main objective b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 percent” (OECD 
1987). 
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marginal player in shaping European development policy. In contrast, Member States like 
France and the United Kingdom have often been considered as the leading actors in these 
processes.  
Carbone argues that the possibilities of the European Commission to influence European de-
velopment policy depend on three conditions: “the presence of an institutional entrepreneur, 
internal cohesiveness and the astute use of a repertoire of tactics” (Carbone 2007). In this re-
spect, the Commission has to manage and reduce its internal fragmentation. Even though the 
Commission is often described as a unitary actor, different Directorate-Generals (DGs) are 
involved in the development policy-making process. Tensions between different DGs, among 
Commissioners as well as between Commissioners and their services can substantially reduce 
the policy formulation capacities of the Commission. This internal fragmentation might not 
just limit the leadership capacities of the Commission vis-à-vis European Member States, but 
also reduces the influence of the EU in international development policy discussions (Arts / 
Dickson 2004; Hewitt / Whiteman 2004). 
Since the adoption of the treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the internal repartition of competences 
in development policy within the Commission has changed several times between functional 
and geographic models. In the current Commission, competences with regard to Africa are 
basically divided between DG External Relations (RELEX), DG Development (DEV) and 
DG Trade.14 This split of competences between DG DEV and other DGs is often regarded as 
also “reflecting the unresolved issue of the relationship between a poverty-reduction oriented 
development policy and the wider concerns of EU external relations” (Dearden 2007, 25). 
With respect to the reform process and the distribution of competences among different DGs, 
criticism has been raised that the role of DG Development has been weakened and that the 
objective of poverty reduction has thus been compromised to the benefit of other foreign rela-
tion’s objectives (Orbie / Versluys 2008, 70). DG Development, however, is mandated with 
formulating the EU’s overall development policy.  
In 2001, EuropeAid was founded as the European development agency. It was meant as an 
answer to severe management shortcomings in the late 1990s. Back then, due to the increas-
ing amount of development aid which had been allocated at the European level, major deficits 
were obviously evident in coordination and implementation.15 EuropeAid is now in charge of 
carrying out the whole project cycle from the tender process to the evaluation. It is responsi-
ble for a range of topics and all regions: it covers projects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship, but also projects within the ACP countries, the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) and for the support of the African Peace Facility. Consequently, Eu-
ropeAid is in charge of development projects from the EDF as well as from the European 
budget. In the light of these competences, the fact that EuropeAid is placed under the author-
                                                 
14  DG Development is in charge of relations with the ACP group. The European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) is placed under its authority. In the framework of the EU-Mediterranean Partnership, DG 
RELEX is responsible for Northern Africa and it is also in charge of development policies towards other re-
gions. EuropeAid is placed under its authority. Furthermore, DG Trade deals with trade relations with ACP 
countries. However, several exceptions from this fundamental division of competencies exist and they add 
to further incoherence. The Pan-African Unity within the DG Development, for instance, is responsible for 
overall African issues, including North Africa and thus exceeding the realm of the ACP (Schukraft 2007; 
Carbone 2007). 
15  In 1999, for instance, only 43 percent of the EDF budget could be spent. 
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ity of DG RELEX enhances the influence of this DG on development issues to the detriment 
of DG DEV (Schukraft 2007; Grimm 2003).16 
The European Council and the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
The European Council decides on the general policy lines and directions of the European 
policies. Since the presidency rotates, African and development issues are placed on the 
agenda depending on the respective priorities and forcefulness of the presiding president. Af-
rica stood high on the agenda during the Irish presidency (2004), the British presidency 
(2005) and the German presidency (2007). This might be different when Member States take 
the office that do not share a high profile on Africa policy or development policy, as the case 
was in 2009 with the Czech Presidency. The General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) became a major decision making body through the reform process in Seville in 
2002. This Council replaces the Development Council and currently integrates the ministries 
of foreign affairs, development, trade and defence, depending on the discussed subjects. 
However, if necessary an informal Development Council can still be called (Schukraft 2007) 
and development issues are placed on the agenda of the GAERC at least twice every year. 
This transfer of competences from the Development Council to the GAERC, however, has 
been highlighted as a growing linkage between development and foreign policy within the EU 
(Molenaers / Nijs 2008, 16). 
The European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) plays a less obvious role in European development policy, 
particularly considering its core competencies. In this policy area the EP perceives itself pri-
marily as an important international dialogue forum. The EP, however, has consistently been 
an ally for development policies (Grimm et al. 2009b). Since the treaty of Amsterdam (1999), 
the EP co-decides with the Commission on development projects funded by the European 
budget. Yet, cooperating with ACP countries, the EP only has to be informed, since the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) is negotiated on an intergovernmental basis; and, therefore, is 
not part of the European budget. The European Parliament has played a particular role in the 
field of democracy and human rights. Even though its competences are de jure limited, the EP 
has an important role in designing and influencing policies towards Africa (Schukraft 2007). 
The Joint Parliamentary Assembly with Parliamentarians from ACP countries, for its part, can 
be considered as a sort of seismograph of ACP-EU relations, but not as a decision-making 
body. It is, furthermore, increasingly becoming an awkward setting if the focus is meant to 
shift towards the AU; the Pan-African Parliament would be a more convincing setting for 
inter-parliamentarian relations, despite institutional shortcomings. 
                                                 
16  The establishment of EuropeAid was part of a broader de-concentration process during which also the Dele-
gations of the European Commission gained more independence and management responsibilities. They 
now hold an important responsibility in the elaboration of the Country Strategy Papers and the National In-
dicative Programmes (NIP), which form the basis for the initiation of development projects. This process of 
decentralisation has also aimed at enhancing the ownership of programmes in partner countries and promot-
ing the coordination between international donors in developing countries (Carbone 2007). 
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The EU Member States 
For a full picture of EU policies, it would be necessary to consider the development policies 
of all 27 EU Member States; an attempt that shall not be undertaken here. Their approaches 
and their respective performance in providing development assistance, however, differ con-
siderably. In a broad brush summary, one can observe that some have stronger interest-driven 
development policies than others and some are stronger engaged in a particular region. The 
northern EU Member States are considered to be among the best performers in providing aid 
measured against the international commitments and DAC standards. They allocate high 
shares of their GDP to aid, privilege poor and relatively democratic countries, favour sector 
and country wide approaches and have low amounts of tied aid. The southern EU Member 
States are often ranked at the opposite end of the performance chart. They provide low shares 
of the GDP to aid, have high amounts of tied or partially tied aid and provide large amounts 
of aid to less poor and comparatively undemocratic countries. The big three – France, the UK 
and Germany (see Box 3) – can be situated in-between these two groups (Carbone 2007). 
Most Eastern and Central European countries started to elaborate development policies only 
with their adherence to the EU. They focus their development policies strongly on their geo-
graphical neighbourhood. 
Increasingly important role for non-state actors in development 
Outside the ACP-EU framework, Europe has been co-financing development activities spon-
sored by European non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for 30 years. The budget line 
'Co-financing with NGOs' was introduced in 1976 in order to support activities intended to 
make a direct and lasting contribution to improving the living conditions in developing coun-
tries as part of comprehensive trade and cooperation agreements (in times before the estab-
lishment of an explicit development policy at EC level). At the end of the 1970s, a specific 
element has been additionally introduced aiming at raising awareness in the European public 
and mobilizing European public in favour of activities with regard to development policy 
(Carbone 2005). 
However, under the Lomé convention EU-ACP relations have been long-time dominated by 
government-to-government relations. The private sectors and civil society had only limited 
access to resources and non-state actors generally were provided with very limited possibili-
ties to participate in ACP-EU relations. During the 1990s, this monopoly of the governments 
as central actors was increasingly perceived to be contradictory to the major changes which 
took place in ACP countries, including multi-party political settings, economic liberalisation 
and decentralisation. Furthermore, the enthusiasm of donor countries to integrate NGOs as 
agents of economic and political change increased.  
Against this background, the broadening and diversification of actors participating in ACP-
EU relations became a key issue during the Cotonou negotiations. With the inception of the 
Cotonou Agreement in 2000, the EU introduced poverty reduction as a major objective, which 
consequently required comprehensive participation of all sectors of society (see Box 4).  
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Box 3: Prominent role for Member States in EU development policy – the big three 
 Amount of aid to 
sub-Saharan Africa 
Special feature Tied aid? 
France 4211 million US$ in 2007 
63% bilateral share of total aid 
 
During the last years, France has 
gradually increased the volume 
of its aid. However, it still allo-
cates aid mainly to less poor and 
less democratic governments and 
has a special focus on Africa. 
France played an influential 
role in the evolution of the 
development policy of the 
European community. How-
ever, France considered devel-
opment policy at the European 
level rather as a mean to main-
tain its own interests and influ-
ence over African countries, 
while at the same time sharing 
the costs of this policy with the 
other Member States. With the 
successive European enlarge-
ments, France lost a large por-
tion of this influence. 
France re-
duced the 
amount of tied 
aid to 15%, 
although it 
had opted 
against the 
untying of aid 
during the 
negotiations at 
the European 
and at the 
DAC level. 
Germany 2761 million US$ in 2007 
65% bilateral share of total aid 
 
Without having a strong colonial 
legacy, Germany is not regional 
specialised in its development 
cooperation; South Africa and 
Nigeria receive special attention. 
The government decided to fos-
ter enhanced partnerships, par-
ticularly on the basis of the 
NEPAD principles and prefera-
bly with countries which have 
been subject to the African peer-
review Mechanism (APRM). 
 
After a change of government 
in 1998, German development 
policy has aspired to transform 
into a ‘global structure policy’, 
aiming at contributing to the 
improvement of the social, 
ecological and political situa-
tions in partner countries. 
Through this amendment, de-
velopment policy also gets 
closer to the core issues and 
functions of foreign policy. 
 
34% of its 
ODA are still 
tied. 
 
Germany 
principally 
supported the 
initiatives of 
untying aid, 
but attached 
certain condi-
tions to it.  
 
United 
Kingdom 
4104 million US$ in 2007 
57% bilateral share of total aid 
in 2007 
The Labour government slowly 
increased aid volumes from the 
late-1990s. It privileges allocat-
ing aid to poor recipient coun-
tries with democratic govern-
ments and Africa became a cen-
tral priority of its development 
programme. 
The UK has used development 
policy also as a platform to 
enhance its stance in interna-
tional relations while maintain-
ing a close relationship with the 
countries of the Common-
wealth. For several decades, the 
UK development policy was 
highly influenced by the US 
and closely linked to the Bret-
ton Woods institutions. 
 
fully untied 
 
UK had been 
one of the 
most vocal 
players in the 
European 
discussion, 
pushing for 
untying aid. 
Source: Author’s compilation, drawing from: EU Donor Atlas (2008); European Commission 
(2008b); Carbone (2007); Engel (2005); Claeys (2004). 
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ACP countries were reluctant and rather opted against the integration of non-state actors since 
they feared that this could further lead to weaken the role of the state. However, in the final 
document, civil society participation was assigned a pivotal role in development processes. 
This acknowledgement represents one of the major changes in Cotonou (Carbone 2005). The 
revision of the Cotonou Convention in 2005, the European Consensus and the joint Africa-EU 
strategy have confirmed the importance of the participation of non-state actors and strength-
ened the formal basis for their involvement. 
The Cotonou agreement can be considered as the first promoter of participation of non-state 
actors and has contributed to the opening up political spaces for non-state actors. Although 
progress has been made since 2000, several constraints and shortcomings still need to be ad-
dressed. The quality of participation seems to produce rather mixed results. On the one hand, 
access to resources and information is still limited. On the other hand, non-state actors are 
often also part of the problem, as they are not very united, compete amongst each other, lack 
structures and experience internal governance problems. There also has been concern that 
non-state actors are used as instruments in order to validate and legitimate EU and ACP poli-
cies. To sum up, in practice the strengthening of the participation of non-state actors is still 
rather difficult, in spite of promising changes. It can be expected that it will take some time 
before participation is broadly implemented and widely mainstreamed (Laporte 2007; FES 
2006). 
Preliminary results: More actors, more diversified interests and increasing need for 
coordination 
The range of actors involved in European development policy in Africa has been broadening 
in recent years. A course of change has been done particularly with the Cotonou agreement 
which opened EU-Africa relations for the first time to African non-state actors. At the same 
time, the Commission has reformed its internal schedule of responsibilities, functions are 
more clearly defined and decentralisation was increased in order to improve subsidiarity. In 
addition, through the creation of EuropeAid as a new comprehensive implementation agency, 
effectiveness of community-level development policy has improved. The European consensus 
Box 4:  Private actors in European development cooperation 
The definition of non-state actors is not limited to NGOs. Instead, it also embraces the private sec-
tor, economic and social partners, farmers’ organisations, the media, grassroots organisations, etc. 
Local governments are also partly included, although they are formally state actors. The Cotonou 
Agreement seeks to create a comprehensive framework to stimulate investments in ACP countries 
through the integration of private sector actors. In this respect, the promotion of public-private sec-
tor dialogue also aims at building up capacities of private sector organisations (Velde / Bilal 2005). 
In 2006, the EU-Africa-Business-Forum was founded in order to promote private investments 
(Wadle 2007). The range of participation of non-state actors is not only limited to the implementa-
tion of development projects, as has been the case in the process of decentralisation, kicked off by 
the Lomé convention in 1990. In addition, non-state actors are also required to influence the pro-
gramming process by which consultation about the allocation of resources in an ACP country take 
place. They further have to be consulted during the evaluation process and shall be provided with 
financial resources and capacity-building support in order to reinforce their capabilities (Laporte 
2007; Carbone 2005). 
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provides a common vision and common objectives for development policy actors at both the 
national and European level. 
However, the dual structure of development aid at the community and national level persist, 
putting into question the prospects to achieve these goals. European development policy and 
European policy towards Africa are still fragmented, old and new structures are often juxta-
posed. Reform processes with regard to the distribution of competences within the European 
Commission, for instance, did not always lead to a reinforcement of development policy ac-
tors (DG DEV) compared to other external relations actors (e.g. DG RELEX). Consequently, 
it will depend much on the interaction between the Member States and the Commission as 
well as on the internal cohesiveness of the Commission if the EU is able to impact on interna-
tional discussions and negotiations on development, if the reformed European policy towards 
Africa will successfully be implemented and if the EU can effectively engage in cooperation 
with China on development policy issues. 
2.3 Comprehensive cooperation: seeking for more coordination and coherence  
European aid in Africa, provided by the European Commission and the Member States, cov-
ers a very broad range of areas from water management, environment and sustainable devel-
opment to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the prevention of conflicts. When 
just looking at the community-level development policy, the second part of the European 
Consensus outlines nine areas in which the Commission will work primarily. In addition, four 
fields are defined as cross-cutting areas.17 In 2007, 30 percent of the EDF was allocated in the 
sector of social infrastructure, 28 percent in the sector of economic infrastructure and another 
20 percent was allocated for budget support, food aid and food security (European Commis-
sion 2008a).18 It will not be possible to address all sectors in this context. However, some 
broad features are highlighted. 
The areas of development policy have been enlarged and widened since the beginning of the 
1990s. On the one hand, as stated above, European development policy became more poverty-
oriented. At the same time, new sectors such as security issues, trade liberalisation, the pro-
motion of democracy and human rights, energy security, conflict prevention and fragile states 
have been increasingly integrated into the spectrum of development policy issues. This has 
also heightened the debate about how to improve the relations amongst policies for the benefit 
of development, i.e. policy coherence for development (cf. Ashoff 2005), most prominently 
with regard to trade, security and environment. The Commission published a Communication 
                                                 
17  The nine areas are: trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable management of natural re-
sources; infrastructure; communication and transport; water and energy; rural development, territorial plan-
ning, agriculture and food security; governance, democracy human rights and support for economic and in-
stitutions reforms; conflict prevention and fragile states; human development; as well as social cohesion and 
employment. Four sectors are defined as cross-cutting areas: democracy, governance and human rights, the 
rights of children and indigenous people, gender equality, environmental sustainability and the fight against 
Aids/HIV (European Parliament, Council, Commission 2006). These sectors are also picked up in the Af-
rica-EU Joint Strategy and the definition of the eight partnerships in which both sides will put special ef-
forts. 
18  In the official DAC definition social infrastructure covers education, health, water, government and civil 
society; economic infrastructure and services cover transport, communications, energy and other services 
(European Commission 2008a). 
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in 2005 on how to increase Policy Coherence for Development (European Commission 
2005b). 
European development policy in Africa is closely intertwined with trade issues; trade policy 
was a key feature of the comprehensive Lomé and Cotonou Agreements. As a cornerstone of 
the Lomé Conventions, the European Union granted unilateral trade preference to African 
countries in the framework of the General System of Preferences (GSP) since the 1970s. Later 
on, other developing countries could also increasingly benefit from GSP regulations. How-
ever, the majority of ACP countries did not manage to exploit these advantages in their trade 
with the EU. In 2001 the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative was launched, eliminating 
duties and quotas for all products from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to enter the Euro-
pean market, except for arms and ammunition. In order to bring its trade policy in line with 
international agreements at the WTO level and due to little success as tool for development in 
Africa, the EU decided to abandon the approach of granting unilateral preferences. Trade lib-
eralisation and regional integration are now promoted as instruments for development policy. 
Since 2002 the EU is negotiating with African countries on Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs) in order to enhance regional economic integration in Africa and to make the 
EU-ACP relations compatible to WTO rules (cf. Makhan 2009 forthcoming). 
Another area with close inter-linkages with development policy is security policy. Already 
during the 1990s (with the failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia and the genocide in 
Rwanda) and particularly since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the interdependence 
between security and development has been increasingly acknowledged. Security issues have 
been more and more integrated into development policy (Messner / Faust 2004; Gänzle 2009). 
The European Africa strategy (2005) and the Joint Africa-EU strategy (2007) put a special 
emphasis on peace and security issues, while supporting African initiatives in this field. In the 
context of development policy, the EU particularly supports the capacity building process for 
administration and policing. In post-conflict states the EU is engaged in the disarmament and 
arms-control measures. The EU – with a broad geographic presence – pays more attention to 
the situation of fragile states which have been somewhat neglected by traditional donors. The 
close interlinkages between security and development have also been taken into account in the 
establishment of the African Peace Facility. Funded by the EDF, this instrument supports op-
erations and capacity building programmes at the level of the AU and Sub-regional organisa-
tions. In the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, a Partnership on Peace and Security 
has been set up (cf. Gänzle 2009). 
Democratic governance processes are considered to be crucial for promoting sustainable de-
velopment, reducing poverty and enhancing (sustainable) security. Following this rationale, 
the EU puts particular emphasis on the promotion and support of democratic governance in its 
development policy. A European Initiative to promote governance was launched in 2006, af-
ter the adoption of the European Consensus. In the framework of this initiative, governance 
projects and strategies of African countries can be supported by an incentive tranche (Euro-
pean Commission 2006). Under the 10th EDF, the Commission puts a special focus on local 
governance. In the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, democratic governance and 
human rights are one of the eight partnership areas. The EU not only supports African re-
gional and continental initiatives to improve governance, such as the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), but it also wants to foster coordination at the global level.  
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Beyond the institutional prerequisites for development, the EU has also increasingly recog-
nised the importance of the development of African infrastructure. The EU-Africa Partnership 
on Infrastructure was launched in 2006, after the publication of the EU Africa strategy. The 
partnership is a response to the AU-NEPAD plan on infrastructure and aims at securing the 
interconnectivity of African regions, building on European experiences on inter-connectivity 
of regions, across state borders. The infrastructure partnership thus focuses on trans-boundary 
projects as well as projects with a regional impact; this, in an EU mindset, can also be seen as 
fostering peace and cooperation within regions. The EU will provide financing for infrastruc-
ture in the area of transport, energy and water and will support regulatory frameworks that 
facilitate trade and services. 
The European Commission and EU Member States are engaged in a broad range of areas. 
This leads to coordination problems, since Commission and Member States are often engaged 
in similar areas in the same countries. The need for stronger coordination and cooperation in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of European aid and to avoid double-work has become in-
creasingly important. In line with the principle of harmonisation in the Paris Declaration, the 
EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour aims at increasing the co-
ordination between different European actors. The code suggests broad guidelines which are 
not legally binding. Among others, EU donors should limit their assistance within a partner 
country to two sectors in which they possess comparative advantages. In order to respect the 
principle of country ownership, partner countries shall be responsible for identifying these 
comparative advantages. In addition, each priority sector in a partner country should be 
guided and coordinated by a ‘lead donor’ in order to reduce transaction costs for the partner 
government. Each donor should further limit its activities to a certain number of countries in 
order to make sure that all partner countries – including sometimes neglected fragile states – 
are covered; the Code of Conduct speaks of not more than five EU donors in any partner 
country (European Commission 2007c; Mürle 2007). 
Establishing a division of labour and concentrating on sectors in line with comparative advan-
tages of EU donors seems to be highly necessary in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
European aid. However, implementing the Code of Conduct will not come without problems 
and the reforms of European aid are undergoing revisions well beyond merely adjusting ad-
ministrative procedures and financing requisites. Schulz strongly questions the prospects for 
implementing this Code of Conduct: “One of the main obstacles is a naïve and un-strategic 
view of division of labour, which does not take into account donor self-interest, or the power 
relationship between donor and partner country, nor the influence of political aspects on de-
velopment cooperation” (Schulz 2007). To put it differently: the concentration of national 
development aid on certain sectors in certain countries would probably mean that donors have 
to leave sectors in countries where they have been active for many years. And this would also 
imply that these donor countries would have to retain from sectors and countries in which 
they see important (national) interests at stake. Another problem results from the application 
of the principle of ownership: de facto donor and recipient stand in a very asymmetrical 
power relation, since the latter depends on the money of the former. Therefore, it appears 
unlikely that the partner country will be in a position to dispel donors from sectors which are 
already covered by other donors (Schulz 2007).19 First field studies seem to indicate that pro-
                                                 
19  Some hope might be fostered because of an increasing attractiveness of Africa, a higher position on the 
international agenda and increase “donor competition” with new, non-DAC donors emerging. 
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gress in coordination among EU donors in partner countries is still very weak (Söderbaum / 
Stalgren 2008). 
European policy discussion towards Africa was long-time compartmentalised into develop-
ment policy issues, despite a long tradition of comprehensive agreements consisting of trade 
preferences and aid deals. However, during the last years, the awareness of the spectrum of 
Europe’s partnership with African states and the continent as a whole has broadened substan-
tially. Increasingly, economic, political and security issues as well as questions of global gov-
ernance are part of the European-African agenda. The European Africa strategy and the Joint 
Africa-EU strategy thus build an important framework beyond traditional North-South rela-
tions. However, much will depend on how (and how fast) this strategy will be implemented 
during the next years. This might also impact on European long-term interest in Africa and 
the perception of whether the system of EU development policy needs further and more fun-
damental reforms or not.  
3 China’s search for a role model: developing country and aid provider 
China’s cooperation policy towards Africa has a long tradition and involves aspects of what is 
defined under development assistance in OECD terms. In contrast to widespread Western 
perceptions, China is not a new donor. Already in 1960 – eleven years after the foundation of 
the People’s Republic and three years after Ghana’s independence – China provided its first 
zero-interest loan to Ghana. Initially, development assistance has been concentrated on very 
few countries. In the mid-1970s, however, Chinese aid programmes covered more African 
countries than those of the United States (Brautigam 2008).  
The overall rational of Sino-African relations has fundamentally changed during the last fifty 
years. Relations have shifted from highly intense interactions during the 60s and 70s to ne-
glect and China’s self-centredness during the 1980s: throughout the 50s, 60s and 70s, China’s 
policy towards Africa was mainly driven by political and ideological objectives. First of all, 
China’s Africa policy aimed at winning recognition as the sole voice of China, directed 
against Taiwan (the ‘One-China-policy’). China’s engagement was, furthermore, dominated 
by the struggle against the two superpowers and the search for leadership of the Third World. 
In the light of very low levels of trade and investment, development assistance played thus a 
major part in the bilateral relations (Thompson 2007). This ratio between aid and other areas 
of China’s external relations have fundamentally been changing during the last years, particu-
larly since the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000.  
3.1 Chinese package deals: interests, principles and objectives 
Chinese officials and scholars do not like to speak about “aid”, similar to an increasingly un-
fashionable use of the term in European countries. The term “aid” is perceived as being an 
expression of the traditional “donor-recipient” relationship between Western powers and de-
veloping countries, build up out of the context of the colonial past. In their official FOCAC 
documents and in China’s Africa policy paper, issued in January 2006, Chinese officials 
would rather use the term “development assistance”.  
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There is much debate about the amount of Chinese assistance. The government does not offi-
cially define what it designates as assistance. As China is not an OECD/DAC member, it nei-
ther uses the DAC definition to calculate its assistance, nor does it publish precise figures of 
how much assistance it provides to African countries.20 In addition, it is not possible to make a 
clear distinction between Chinese development assistance and other areas of its relations with 
Africa. Consequently, estimates about the amount of China’s assistance bear different results. 
The EU Commission estimates that China’s development assistance, calculated on the basis 
of the DAC definition, amounts to 1.5 billion US$ per year (European Commission 2008b). 
Other sources indicate that China provided approximately 4.5 billion US$ to African coun-
tries, only in the year 2006 (Davies et al. 2008). 
One can distinguish four modes of delivery of assistance: (i) technical assistance and grants, 
(ii) interest-free loans, (iii) concessional loans and (iv) debt relief. A special fund, allocated by 
the Ministry of Finance, provides budget lines to the MOFCOM for its assistance projects. 
Funds from this foreign assistance budget can be primarily considered as China’s develop-
ment assistance. The ratio of grants to loans is not quite clear and seems to vary from year to 
year. However, concessional loans are often considered to take the major portion of assis-
tance. Furthermore, the precise amount of debt relief is difficult to calculate. Debt cancella-
tions seem to be mostly interest free loans. Some argue that the Chinese government would 
provide more interest free loans than grants in order to have a second instrument by cancelling 
the debt later on (Brautigam 2008). 
Major objectives of China’s Africa policy 
The objectives and principles of China’s cooperation with Africa are mainly formulated in 
China’s Africa strategy paper and in declarations and action plans of the three Forums of 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summits in 2000, 2003 and 2006.21 After a strategy pa-
per on relations with the European Union in 2003, the Africa strategy paper was only the sec-
ond White Paper issued by the Chinese government on a region or a country. Both papers are 
considered to illustrate the importance China attaches to the relations to these two regions.  
Following the documents, the main objectives of China’s Africa policy are the promotion of 
peace and stability, social and economic development as well as common prosperity. At first 
glance, the objectives of China’s Africa policy seem to be largely similar to European objec-
tives towards Africa. However, in some aspects, one can identify slight differences in empha-
sis, for instance with respect to the MDGs. In contrast to Europe’s Africa policy, the 
achievement of the MDGs is not very prominent in China's approach towards Africa. In 
China's Africa strategy paper the MDGs are mentioned as part of multilateral cooperation. In 
the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009, the two sides – China and African states – agree to work 
together in order to improve the progress evaluation framework of the MDGs „to oversee and 
facilitate the delivery of commitments on international cooperation and development“ (Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation 2006). However, their achievement does not appear as an over-
                                                 
20  The possible reasons why China has not been publishing its own government aid figures are discussed wide-
ly. For a comprehensive overview see: Davies (2007). 
21  See Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Programme for China-Africa Coopera-
tion in Economic and Social Development, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation – Addis Ababa Action 
Plan, Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation Action Plan 2007-2009.  
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riding objective, guiding China’s own Africa policy. This does not imply that the MDGs are 
not important for Chinese foreign policy in general. They are, however, more often mentioned 
in international fora and negotiations in order to remind industrialised countries of the prom-
ises and pledges they have made to support developing countries.22 
The fact that on the level of discourse China does not put so much emphasis on the MDGs 
and on poverty reduction in its relations with Africa can also be explained by China’s overall 
perception of Africa which varies from Western perceptions. Chinese officials and scholars 
speak to a lesser extent about poverty and poverty reduction strategies when they speak about 
Africa. China does not see Africa as a poor continent in need of Chinese help, in the first 
place. In the official documents and on the websites of FOCAC, the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MFA) and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) African countries are rarely presented in 
terms of their efforts to reduce poverty, resolve conflicts and improve their development. In-
stead, Chinese highlight the idea of common prosperity, and Africa is rather perceived and 
presented as an opportunity for doing business, trade and investments (King 2006). 
Major principles of China’s Africa policy 
The principles and norms of China’s Africa policy clearly differs from European principles 
and norms in its relationship with Africa, as expressed in China’s Africa strategy paper and in 
speeches made by Chinese politicians. China’s Africa strategy paper outlines the following 
terms as the main guiding principles: sincerity, friendship and equality, mutual benefit (often 
also named as “win-win“ situation), reciprocity and common prosperity, mutual support and 
close coordination, learning from each other and seeking common development, the One-
China principle as well as the five principles of peaceful coexistence (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2006). The five principles of peaceful coexistence are one of the main theoretic foun-
dations for China’s foreign policy. Originally, they have been introduced in the 1950s for the 
relations towards India. The principles are: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal af-
fairs, equality and mutual benefit as well as peaceful co-existence (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs 2004). The principles of China’s current policy towards Africa are referring, further-
more, to the „Eight principles for China’s aid to foreign countries“, laid down by Prime Min-
ister Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s, during a visit in Africa (see Box 5). Interestingly, these 
principles already point to two discussions which are well known today: They highlight the 
problem of aid dependency of recipient countries; and they ask Chinese experts in Africa to 
live in the same conditions and standards as people in recipient countries. 
                                                 
22  See, for instance, Wen Jiabao’s speech on the occasion of the UN High-level Event on MDGs in September 
2008. 
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Under the overall banner of South-South relations, the Chinese leadership established a com-
prehensive discourse on the principles of its relations with Africa. The Chinese government 
highlights the common grounds and the common interests in Sino-African relations. This dis-
course aims at creating a common Sino-African identity in order to plaster differences in bi-
lateral relations with regard to conflicting interests or contradictory practice to principles. In 
contrast to European discourses, African countries are designated as “friends” or “brothers”, 
sharing similar historical experiences as both sides have been colonised by Western powers. 
China’s discourse is thus deeply rooted in and often refers to the perceived history and long 
tradition of Sino-African relations – emphasising continuity, not changes. In opposition to 
Western approaches, which would rather want to look ahead and speaking of milestones in 
changes (i.e. deviations from the past), the Chinese leadership emphasises the continuity of 
the fundamental patterns in bilateral relations. Principles such as third world solidarity, the 
five principles of peaceful co-existence and China’s own standing as a developing country 
have been guiding Sino-African relations since the foundation of the PRC. The Chinese lead-
ership stresses that they will also remain the fundamental basis for the new strategic partner-
ship (Alden / Alves 2008). 
In its conceptual papers and speeches, the Chinese government puts emphasis on the ideas of 
equality, mutual benefit and support as the guiding principles for Sino-African relations. In 
Box 5: The eight principles of China’s aid to foreign countries, outlined in 1964  
 by Zhou Enlai 
“a. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in pro-
viding aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something 
mutual.  
b.  In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the 
recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.  
c.  China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time 
limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as 
possible.  
d.  In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipi-
ent countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance 
and independent economic development.  
e.  The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require 
less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their 
income and accumulate capital.  
f.  The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at 
international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are 
not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them. 
g.  In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the 
recipient country fully master such technique.  
h.  The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same 
standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to 
make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.  
These eight principles fully give expression to the sincere desire of China in seeking to conduct eco-
nomic and cultural cooperation with the newly-emerged countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.”
Source:  Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) 
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this respect, development assistance is not presented as altruism and charity, but rather as 
beneficial for both sides. In addition, Chinese often point out that they treat African countries 
all equal and would not differentiate, for instance, between strategically more or less impor-
tant countries. Although the amounts might differ strongly, China is providing aid to all Afri-
can countries which have diplomatic relations with China. On the FOCAC website, also the 
small countries get a comparatively high level of attention, and China has now established 
embassies in more African countries than the United States or France or any other European 
country, comparable only with the number of EC delegations. 
China highlights its own position as a developing country, which can only provide assistance 
„in the light of its own financial capacity and economic situation“ (Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation 2006). Chinese officials sometimes characterise the relations as bringing together 
“the largest developing country with the continent with the largest number of developing 
countries.” This discourse is apparently inconsistent with China’s “contemporary international 
recognition as an economic superpower” (Alden / Alves 2008; He 2008b). On the African 
side, China’s self-portrayal as a developing country is not openly questioned by African gov-
ernments. However, the justifications that African leaders provide for their cooperation with 
China rather reflects their perception of China as an emerging power, disposing of major eco-
nomic, political and technological resources (Alden / Alves 2008). In this respect, expecta-
tions from African countries vis-à-vis China – despite the expectation management of the 
Chinese side – are very likely to grow. In global fora, China presents itself often rather as the 
elder sibling of African countries – the partner who takes the lead in the relationship and who 
is willing to present common interests in international organisations. 
The principle of non-interference 
The principle of non-interference is frequently stressed in discourses of Chinese officials and 
it takes a prominent place in the policy documents. Undoubtedly, the principle is informed by 
China’s own desire that other countries should not interfere in its internal affairs and criticise, 
for instance China’s human rights policy, which is understood by the Chinese government as 
an internal affairs.23 The principle is historically rooted in China’s experience of humiliation 
by Western powers in the 19th century and was thus established as a main pillar, when Beijing 
built up its foreign policy (Taylor 2007). The principle of non-interference continues to be an 
important element of the self-image China is projecting to the outside world and it is part of 
its concept of creating a ‘harmonious world’. It does, however, stand in contrast to Europe’s 
Africa policy and to the policies formulated by (not necessarily the practice of) the AU and 
NEPAD. Already the essence of the five principles of peaceful coexistence is mainly about 
the idea of not intervening in each others internal affairs which can be at odds with recent 
initiatives, such as the debates about the responsibility to protect.24  
Though not openly discussed, there seems to be increasing agreement in China’s scholar 
community that this principle looses more and more its significance when it comes to practi-
cal policies. Already in the 1950s and 1960s China was actively supporting liberation move-
                                                 
23  In the international debate, Human rights are not considered to be internal affairs of the nation states.  
24  Responsibility to protect is a new concept in international relations, which aims at highlighting the ethical 
and moral responsibility of the international community, particularly the United Nations, vis-à-vis states 
which do not want to or can not respect basic principles of good governance. 
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ments in Africa. Today, as China is developing from a regional to a global power and interna-
tional expectations vis-à-vis China’s international responsibility are growing, the principle of 
non-interference is de facto coming under visible strain. In addition, with increasing Chinese 
investments in Africa, the necessity to protect investors – and Chinese citizens in partner 
countries – equally increases (see Box 6). As one Chinese scholar states: “Frankly speaking, I 
agree that the ‘non-interference’ policy today is facing new challenges such as how to re-
sponse the human rights issue and poor governance in some African countries” (He 2008a). A 
modification of the principle of non-interference is most obvious in the case of Sudan, where 
the Chinese leadership exerted influence on the Sudanese government in order to prompt the 
government to accept a common AU and UN peacekeeping force in Darfur (Large 2008). 
Furthermore, in their political discourses Chinese officials explicitly highlight that in contrast 
to Western donors and the international financial institutions of the Bretton Woods system 
China does not attach any political or economic conditions to its development assistance. For 
China, economic development, the integrity of national sovereignty and poverty reduction are 
considered to be more important than merely political objectives. Conditionalities are offi-
cially perceived to be an expression of moral arrogance and neo-colonialism. Other develop-
ing countries like India also object the imposition of conditionalities (Fues / Grimm / Laufer 
2006). However, China’s aid to Africa was never fully apolitical, since foreign aid by defini-
tion represents an intervention in the domestic situation of recipient countries. When China 
invests in states with an oppressive regime, it aims at protecting its investments and therefore 
often supports the regime in place (Dahle-Huse / Muyakwa 2008). The investment itself can 
already contribute to regime stabilisation. As a clear precondition for the establishment of 
bilateral relations, China still imposes the One-China principle.25  
In addition, like other emerging donors – and contrary to the DAC discourse and the princi-
ples of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, China ties its development projects to the 
use of Chinese goods and services. Apparently, 70 percent of Chinese aid is spent on Chinese 
workers and materials (Chaponnière 2008). This has caused severe criticism in recent years. 
The concrete situation in most African countries is not quite clear due to the fact that only few 
case studies have been conducted, leading to mixed results. African governments seem to 
have some leeway to negotiate. This margin is used quite differently. In Angola, for instance, 
only 30 percent of local workers are employed in Chinese corporations, whereas in Tanzania 
80 percent is local staff (Asche / Schüller 2008). 
Bilateral government-to-government relations 
China’s overall approach towards Africa is highly dominated by its bilateral relations with 
African countries; regional, pan-African or multilateral endeavours, on the other hand, clearly 
take a backseat. The Chinese government negotiates concrete cooperation projects merely on 
a bilateral basis with African countries, and aid is almost exclusively disbursed directly to 
recipient governments.  
The Chinese leadership, however, is aspiring to deepen the multilateral aspects of its Africa 
policy. It aims not only to increase the cooperation between African states and China in inter-
                                                 
25  This principle is not unfamiliar to German foreign policy. The Federal Republic of Germany adopted the 
“Hallsteindoktrin” in 1955. In line with this doctrine, West Germany often interrupted relations with foreign 
countries if they started relations with the German Democratic Republic.  
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national multilateral fora like the UN. In addition, the FOCAC meeting was created in 2000 
as a multilateral forum in order to promote the interests of both sides. According to the FO-
CAC Action Plans 2004-2006 and 2007-2009, China is seeking to consolidate and foster its 
support for and cooperation with regional organisations and initiatives, namely the African 
Union (AU) and NEPAD. However, problems could arise from the fact that to some extent 
different values and norms characterise African regional organisations and China’s engage-
ment with them. With respect to NEPAD, China obviously does not support the whole 
agenda, which also covers the promotion of democracy, rule of law and a free press. If China 
is asked to increase its support for NEPAD, Western donors have to expect that the focus of 
the NEPAD agenda could be shaped from governance questions towards infrastructure and 
other sectoral areas of cooperation (Taylor 2007). In addition, the AU has established mecha-
nisms to interfere in case of severe abuses of human rights, although not yet tested in practice. 
For instance, China’s attitude towards the African Peer Review Mechanism that has a clear 
‘good governance’ agenda could become a test case. China would need to support regional 
organisations that have their own independent principles and norms (Fues / Grimm / Laufer 
2006). 
China’s interests in Africa 
China’s interests in Africa have to be understood in the general context of China’s external 
relations and thus be placed in a close relationship with its domestic policies. “For Chinese 
leadership, foreign policy is a domestic politics continuation. It is determined by domestic 
politics and should serve the domestic politics and economics” (Song 2005). Since the begin-
ning of the ‘opening up and reform policy’ in 1978, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) often depends on the economic performance and the increase in wealth of the 
people. Consequently, one major objective of the Communist Party is to ensure the country’s 
economic development. In this regard, China’s different policies in Africa aim at sustaining 
China’s economic growth, creating a stable international environment and promoting China’s 
development from a regional to a global power. China, therefore, pursues a rather pragmatic 
and un-ideological approach (Sutter 2008; Saunders 2006). 
Like other non-DAC donors, China provides its development assistance as part of bigger 
packages deals which aim at promoting different political and/or economic interests. Krage-
lund rightly stresses the importance of closely analysing how development assistance cataly-
sis other flows of Chinese economic activities, which are most probably more significant than 
assistance. This relationship and the overall impact of the Chinese “aid, investment and trade 
package”26 on the development in recipient countries seem to be much more important, than 
focusing merely on the question of the amount of assistance (Kragelund 2008). However, in 
the light of missing figures, only very broad trends can currently be indicated. 
                                                 
26  NB: Contrary to the EU packages, the Chinese packet includes investments – as the line between state en-
terprises and aid is less clearly defined by the Chinese. European aid can only aspire to attract investments; 
they cannot, however, be combined with private investments that clearly, as the ODA definition prevents 
states from mingling commercial interests too closely with aid.  
 Christine Hackenesch 
38 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Economic and resource interests 
In order to sustain domestic economic growth, African resources such as oil, gas and minerals 
are becoming increasingly important for China. Although Chinese-African trade relations 
cover a broad range of areas and Chinese firms are engaging in very different sectors and 
countries, China’s imports from Africa are still dominated by fuels and mining products, ac-
counting for more than two-thirds of Chinese imports. China has been a net importer of oil 
since 1993; in 2003 it has become the second largest importer after the United States. Access 
to resources in the neighbouring countries is limited and the Middle Eastern countries – mar-
kets largely in the hands of Western exploitation companies – additionally bear high risks of 
crises and instability. For these reasons, the Chinese leadership aims at diversifying its provi-
sions. Africa takes an increasingly important part in this attempt: More than 31 percent of 
China’s overall oil imports come from Africa and Africa’s portion of the overall Chinese oil 
imports is likely to further increase (Downs 2007; Alden 2007). 
First, aid is apparently used as a major bargaining counter in order to secure these energy sup-
plies. The case of Angola represents one outstanding example: In 2006, Chinese oil imports 
from Angola already exceeded those from Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Angola is by far 
the most important destination for Chinese interest-free loans and concessional loans (Asche / 
Schüller 2008). The high concentration of development assistance within some resource rich 
countries can also be demonstrated using the example of concessional loans. It is estimated 
that the major part of concessional loans are provided for infrastructure projects. 80 percent of 
these loans are given to five African countries, namely Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan 
and Zimbabwe (Reilly / Na 2007). 
Second, Africa seems to be a particularly promising base for Chinese manufacturing and con-
struction corporations, and development aid seems to be used in order to ameliorate business 
opportunities for Chinese companies (Pehnelt / Abel 2007). In 2002, the Chinese government 
initiated its “going global” strategy. Their objective is to transform Chinese State-owned en-
terprises into globally competitive trans-national corporations, establishing them as powerful 
players in key sectors for Chinese development. Africa takes an important part in this strat-
egy. Chinese corporations invest particularly in infrastructure and the construction industry in 
order to get a share in local markets. These markets have been dominated by Western and 
partly African companies for a long time. China’s market share of the construction and civil 
engineering sector in Africa grew from four percent in 1995 to 21 percent in 2005, becoming 
the second biggest supplier after France (MTETM 2007). Currently, Chinese construction 
corporations are estimated to win 50 percent of African Development Bank (AfDB) bids and 
35 percent of the World Bank bids in Africa (interview with Western diplomat in Beijing Oc-
tober 2008). 
Third, African consumer markets are becoming increasingly important for China’s manufac-
turing industry, not only in the low value segment, but also – albeit to a lesser extent – in the 
high-value added and technologically more sophisticated product segments. China’s exports 
to Africa are mainly composed of manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment as 
well as textiles and clothing. Chinese State-owned enterprises, backed by support from the 
government, are willing to invest in countries and sectors with high risks. However, Chinese 
private investors are more reluctant and in some countries and segments, investment risks are 
still considered to be high. As a general tendency, Chinese firms see the future potential of 
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African markets rather than the current benefits (interview with Chinese scholar October 
2008). 
Fourth, investing in Africa is rewarding for Chinese companies in order to access third mar-
kets, particularly US or European markets. For the textile sector, a classical triangle trade 
schema can be identified: China imports cotton from West African countries, exports yarn and 
cloth made in China to different African countries, Chinese enterprises fabricate textiles in 
these countries and export these textiles to the US (AGOA) and to a lesser extent to the EU. 
The European GSP and Everything But Arms (EBA) systems in the sector of trade are con-
sidered to have stricter rules of origin than AGOA so that African textile exports go mainly to 
the US. The overall impact of China’s exports and investments on African development is not 
quite clear and may have mixed results. For African consumers, Chinese products often bear 
the advantage of being more affordable than Western products. In some sectors and some 
countries, Chinese investments can create new capacities or have catalysing effects. At the 
same time, particularly in the textile sector, it has been argued that Chinese exports squeeze 
African producers (and Chinese producers long-time implemented in the African market) out 
of the market (cf. Kragelund 2007; Asche / Schüller 2008).  
China’s political interests in Africa 
Beside these important economic and resource interests, China also has political and strategic 
interests in Africa. They are often promoted by highly visible public diplomacy initiatives 
such as the construction of stadiums and public buildings. Examples for these initiatives in-
clude new office buildings for the foreign affairs ministries in Angola and Mozambique, 
presidential palaces in Zimbabwe and DR Congo, as well as stadiums in Sierra Leone and 
Central African Republic. African leaders have appreciated initiatives very much (Alden 
2007).  
The promotion of the One-China principles remains one of the major objectives of China’s 
Africa policy. Already during the process of ruling Taiwan out of the permanent seat in the 
UN Security Council in 1971, African support has been crucial for Beijing. Until the end of 
the 1990s, Taiwan could retain major support in several African regions. However, the turn-
around of Senegal in 2005 and Chad in 2006 have been major setbacks for Taiwan, since it 
now only holds diplomatic relations with four African countries, namely Burkina Faso, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Gambia and Swaziland. However, Taiwan continues to be an important 
topic for Beijing’s policy towards Africa, since several African countries have already played 
China and Taiwan off against each other, switching recognition in order to quest aid pack-
ages; Senegal being a case in point (Thompson 2007). 
China also seeks the support of African countries in international organisations in order to 
reinforce its claim to political and economic power and to promote its emergence from a re-
gional to a global power. The Chinese leadership aims at promoting a multi-polar world and 
limiting US hegemony. In this respect, China seeks alliances with the developing world, and 
particularly with African countries. African countries bear the numerical advantage of being 
the largest single regional grouping and they tend towards 'bloc voting' in multilateral institu-
tions based on principle of one-country, one-vote. African countries can also prevent China 
from international political isolation as happened for instance after the events on Tiananmen 
in June 1989 when most Western countries imposed sanctions on the Chinese regime. In addi-
tion, African countries often provide very reliable support, when China is criticised by West-
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ern countries. In the UN Commission on Human Rights, for instance, African votes have of-
ten been instrumental to impede resolutions condemning China’s human rights violations 
(Alden 2007). 
Moreover, China’s Africa policy can also be regarded as a sort of ‘test case’ to demonstrate 
the validity of China’s concept of the “harmonious development”. The concept has been out-
lined by Hu Jintao in 2004, replacing the previously introduced term of “peaceful rise”. Simi-
lar to the discourse about South-South relations, the idea of fostering “harmonious develop-
ment” strengthens the mutual advantages of China’s development: It is not only beneficial for 
China but also for developing countries. Africa is an important target region for China in or-
der to demonstrate that its emergence as a global power is indeed peaceful and that China, in 
contrast to previously emerging powers, will not destabilize the international system or be 
harmful for the interests of African countries. 
Box 6: China’s growing awareness of security issues  
China’s policies in Africa are facing several security challenges. Mining activities of Chinese enter-
prises fall prey to violence: Chinese workers have been kidnapped in Nigeria, Sudan or Somalia. In 
addition, the Chinese government is concerned about the increasing military activities of other ma-
jor powers, for instance, the newly established Africa Command (AFRICOM) of the United States. 
The Chinese government seems to be increasingly acknowledging the significance of non-
traditional security issues and is engaging more in collective security actions. China has stepped-up 
the number of its blue helmets to more than 2,000, serving in ten peace-keeping missions world-
wide (International Crisis Group 2009). Furthermore, China committed itself to provide material 
and financial support for African security organisations at the FOCAC meeting in 2006, e.g. the 
Peace and Security Council of the AU. The AU mission in Sudan was also supported. 
Another objective of China’s diplomatic strategy towards Africa is linked to its strategic 
competition with other countries, not least so India and Japan. The creation of the FOCAC 
meeting can be regarded, inter alia, as a response to the Japanese “Tokyo International Con-
ference on African Development” (TICAD), held for the first time in 1993 (interview with 
Chinese scholar October 2008). India also has a long tradition of relations with Africa and 
does increasingly provide development assistance to African countries. The competition be-
tween China and India is not only about resources or markets; both aim at taking a leading 
role in the developing world. India’s democratic system may sometimes facilitate its relations 
with African democracies and Western donors and therefore, India may to some degree be 
less exposed to Western criticism (Broadman 2008). 
Preliminary results: The originality of China’s Africa policy 
China has elaborated a comprehensive approach towards Africa. The originality of China’s 
Africa policy lies in the close linkage of development assistance to the provision of resources, 
foreign direct investment, trade flows and diplomatic initiatives. This lack of distinction and 
clarity makes it difficult to assess Chinese engagement. However, this does not necessarily 
imply that Chinese engagement is less effective for African development.  
Chinese development assistance is hardly motivated by pure altruism and charity – and it does 
not claim to be. The idea of development assistance as an altruistic support for other countries 
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is mostly absent in the Chinese debate. Instead, development assistance is seen as an integral 
part of China’s interest policy, with the idea that relations should be beneficial for both sides: 
“China is in Africa, above all, to solve its own internal problems, not Africa’s problems. It is 
helping Africa in order to help itself” (Kitissou 2007). Against this background, the Chinese 
leadership has established a strong discourse, presenting the principles and objectives of 
China’s Africa policy and placing Sino-African relations in the broader context of South-
South cooperation.  
In short, this discourse apparently has different functions: It aims at papering over diverging 
interests and differing principles in Sino-African relations. It seeks to assure African leaders 
that, while China is emerging as an international economic and political power, it will respect 
and consider African interests. This aspect is closely related to the objective of elaborating a 
relationship which differs from Africa’s relations with Western partners (Alden / Alves 2008). 
China’s discourse towards Africa thus serves as an instrument to reconcile its own oscillating 
identity, as the country is currently pulled between its self-declared status as a developing 
country and its desire for international power and recognition. At the same time, China’s 
growing influence and power will certainly increase African expectations vis-à-vis China’s 
support. 
3.2 A prominent role for state actors: Diversification of actors leading to tensions? 
Since the beginning of the reform and opening up in 1978, the actors and mechanisms in 
China’s foreign policy decision-making are transforming. One can identify several tendencies: 
The number of the actors participating in the day to day decision making is increasing – “the 
elite is thickening” (Lampton 2001). China’s participation in international institutions and the 
general intensification of external relations strengthens the professionalisation of the political 
elite and the bureaucratization of the decision making process (ibid.). Zhao introduces the 
term of horizontal and consultative authoritarianism. He demonstrates that China’s foreign 
policy decision making process is increasingly based on a system of compromise, consulta-
tion and competition between different actors, who often have diverging interests (Zhao 
1996). These general developments and principles of Chinese foreign policy making can also 
be observed with regard to China’s Africa policy. 
As a consequence of the general intensification of Sino-African relations, the number of ac-
tors involved in China’s relations with Africa has been increasing and diversifying in recent 
years. However, China’s Africa policy is to a large extent still dominated by state actors and 
state-to-state relations. In this respect, China’s relations with Africa constitute no exception 
from relations with other regions and countries. Private enterprises and particularly civil soci-
ety actors are involved to a lesser extent than state actors. However, the government has taken 
some initiatives to promote their engagement.  
Chinese state actors 
The Central Committee of the CCP and its Politburo decide on the general objectives and lay 
out broad policy guidelines of China’s Africa policy. However, the general importance of the 
central leadership in every-day foreign policy making has been decreasing since 1978. Mem-
bers of the Central Committee are less involved in daily decision-making. They posses, how-
ever, a veto and arbitration position: In conflict situations between different ministries or be-
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tween the ministries and state-owned enterprises (SOE) they have the final say. The CCP 
Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), currently chaired by President Hu 
Jintao, provides a platform for members of the central leadership of the party and high repre-
sentatives of the central bureaucracy to discuss foreign policy topics. The FALSG is a non-
permanent coordination body, taking a bridging role between the bureaucracy and high level 
party cadres. Even though this organ is not directly involved in the decision-making process, 
its recommendations are likely to have an important impact (Lu 2001). 
The State Council decides on the national budget and the proportion that will be designated as 
development assistance. Under its control, the central bureaucracy implements the broad pol-
icy lines and objectives set by the central leadership. In case of China’s Africa policy, the 
MOFCOM, the MFA, the Ministry of Finance, and to a lesser extent the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health are involved (see for above and 
below Diagram 1). In addition, the State Council’s National Development and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC) is becoming an increasingly important actor with regard to Africa. The 
NDRC is responsible for elaborating long-term macroeconomic strategies. Its focus on energy 
and security is enhancing its role in shaping Chinese activities in Africa (Alden 2007). 
 
 
Diagram 1: Chinese institutions for development cooperation in Africa 
 
Source: Asche and Schüller (2008) 
State Council 
China EXIM China Deve-
lopment Bank 
(CDB) 
Ministry of 
Finance 
(MOF) 
Other 
ministries 
Local 
govern-
ments of 
other 
provinces 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) 
NDRC Na-
tional Devel-
opment and 
Reform Com-
mission 
Regional De-
partments: SSA, 
West Asia and 
North Africa 
Department 
for Incomig 
Aid 
DAFC
DWAA 
DFEC 
Chinese Embassy 
Economic and 
Commercial 
Counsellor’s 
Office 
Ministry of 
Commerce  
MOFCOM 
China and the EU’s engagement in Africa 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 43 
The Ministry of Commerce 
Due to the growing importance of economic activities in China’s foreign relations, the MOF-
COM has become an increasingly influential foreign policy actor in recent years. However, in 
the case of China’s Africa policy, MOFCOM plays an even more central role than in China’s 
policies towards other regions. The central role of MOFCOM in the provision of development 
assistance already indicates the integrated approach of Chinese foreign aid and the close rela-
tionship between trade, investment and aid. 
Three departments in MOFCOM deal with Africa. The Department of West Asia and African 
Affairs (DWAA) advises on policy issues to top decision makers and has a coordinating role 
throughout the Ministry. The Department for Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) is in 
charge of incoming foreign aid to China, it has the authority to regulate Chinese companies 
and thus responsible for Chinese overseas workers. Being in charge of the administration of 
Chinese development assistance, the Department on Aid to Foreign Countries (DAFC) man-
ages the bidding process for aid projects, oversees the projects themselves, and takes direct 
responsibility for the safety and quality of the construction in aid projects. It has approxi-
mately 80 staff members (Reilly / Na 2007). In addition, MOFCOM can rely on Economic 
and Commercial Counsellors’ Offices (ECC) in the Chinese embassies in Africa. They are 
submitted to the administrative authority of the embassy, but the MOFCOM perceives them 
as their representatives. Together with the MOFCOM, the Ministry of Finance sets up the 
foreign aid budget. Multilateral aid is also put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Fi-
nance. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Once the general foreign policy lines have been decided by the central leadership of the party, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsible for interpreting these guidelines, elabo-
rating the concrete policies towards a country or a region, and implementing the policies. This 
procedure aspires to make specific policy decisions keep in line with the overall political 
strategy. The MFA also has to provide information on foreign countries for the central leader-
ship (Lu 2001, 50). There are two departments responsible for African affairs: the Department 
for West Asia and North Africa as well as the Africa Department.  
The MFA has elaborated China’s Africa policy paper and takes an important role in the FO-
CAC negotiations. In the context of China’s aid programme, MFA takes to a large extent an 
advisory function vis-à-vis the MOFCOM. The local embassies in Africa are involved in the 
elaboration of the specific country programmes. However, with regard to their comprehensive 
tasks, their monitoring capacities seem rather limited (Asche / Schüller 2008). 
China’s policy banks27 
China’s policy banks are also important actors of China's development assistance for Africa, 
particularly the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and to a lesser extent, but with an increasingly 
influential role, the China Development Bank (CDB). Controlled by the State Council, they 
were both established in 1994. The main objective of EXIM Bank is to promote and support 
                                                 
27  Banks in China are classified into different types. A distinction is often made between “policy banks” such 
as CDB, Sinosure and EXIM Bank and state-owned commercial banks. 
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Chinese exports and foreign investments. Conservative estimates by the United States Export-
Import Bank indicate that by 2010 EXIM Bank’s medium and long-term financing could 
reach 40 billion US$. In comparison, the World Bank’s financing currently totals about 25 
billion US$. EXIM would become the world’s largest export credit agency (Chan-Fishel / 
Lawson 2007). 
In contrast to Western bi- and multilateral lending institutions, EXIM Bank’s lending is con-
sidered to be more flexible, willing to take more risks. Thus, these lending practices are ar-
guably better responding to the needs of African elites (Alden 2007). EXIM Bank is the sole 
Chinese provider of concessional loans to governments abroad. These concessional loans 
have generated much discussion of how Chinese aid is linked to access to natural resources 
and contracts for Chinese firms. Concessional loans are granted to borrowing governments 
with the objective of promoting “economic development and improve living standards in de-
veloping countries” and to further “boost economic cooperation between developing countries 
and China.” The main project sectors are infrastructure (energy, transport, and communica-
tion), industry (manufacturing, mining) and social welfare projects. As a general rule, EXIM 
Bank demands that 50 percent of procurements should be provided from China.28 By the end 
of 2005, EXIM Bank made 800 Million US$ loans to 55 projects in 22 African countries. 
From 2001 to 2005 the concessional loan programme grew 35 percent annually and Western 
experts assume that this growth rate has not declined. At the same time, concessional loans 
represented only three percent of EXIM Bank’s assets (Brautigam 2008). In the process of 
providing concessional loans, EXIM Bank has to coordinate closely with MOFCOM, which 
may lead to conflicts between the two agents.29  
The main focus of the CDB originally was domestic financing, noticeably in domestic infra-
structure, power stations or public facilities. Only recently, CDB started to expand its activi-
ties of lending abroad. However, its overseas activities are growing rapidly since 2007, creat-
ing potential conflict with EXIM Bank, since CDB offers products similar to EXIM Bank’s, 
with the exception of concessional loans. CDB does not provide development assistance, but 
operates as a commercial bank. However, it manages the China Africa Development Fund 
(CADF), a 5 billion US$ equity fund announced during the Beijing FOCAC meeting in 2006. 
The fund can not be considered as aid, but it may promote development in Africa, as the fund 
provides capital for Chinese companies and Chinese-African joint venture companies in order 
to promote their activities in Africa. However, African entrepreneurs without Chinese partners 
do not have access to this fund, which might be perceived as another unfair advantage of Chi-
nese investors (Brautigam 2008). 
The State-owned enterprises 
Aid projects are mostly carried out by Chinese state-owned enterprises. SOE have to qualify 
and apply in an internal selection process in order to be allowed to carry out aid projects. 
Since 2003, the operational authority over these enterprises lies within the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The SASAC is either the owner of 
SOEs or it is holding a controlling share. Having ministry-level status and thus being placed 
directly under the State Council, the SASAC is responsible for assuring the quality manage-
                                                 
28  See: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp, accessed 26 October 2008.  
29  For a description of the negotiation process of concessional loans also see (Davies et al. 2008, 18). 
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ment and increasing the value of the SOE. At provincial and city level, the same structures 
have been introduced. The national SASAC then has the administrative authority over provin-
cial SASACs; the provincial SASAC has the operational authority over the provincial SOE 
and so forth (Reilly / Na 2007). 
The sub-national and non-state level 
Furthermore, Chinese provinces and cities play an important and twofold role in China’s Af-
rica policy. First, the central government may ask them to implement development assistance 
programmes. For instance in the health sector, the relevant departments from Chinese prov-
inces cooperate with African counterparts. In addition, some Chinese provinces have their 
own development assistance programmes, even though information about the amount and 
coverage are very limited (Asche / Schüller 2008). Provinces and cities are setting up a grow-
ing number of twinning programmes with African regions and cities. In 2007, 73 cooperation 
programmes in 28 countries have been in existence, with a special focus on East Africa and 
English speaking countries (Lévy / Gaborit / Rotteleur 2008). Secondly, particularly export-
oriented provinces and cities like Guangdong, Jiangsu or Shanghai have important business 
interests in Africa, as SOE affiliated at the provincial or city level are highly active in Africa. 
They make up approximately 88 percent of all Chinese firms engaging in FDI abroad 
(Broadman 2007, 305). 
Beyond doubt, state actors dominate China’s international relations with Africa in general and 
China’s aid programme in particular. However, some actors below the state level, though of-
ten still affiliated with the state can also be identified. In 2005, for instance, the China Africa 
Business Council was founded as a Public Private Partnership. It aims at promoting Chinese 
private investments in Africa and providing a platform for Chinese firms in order to familiar-
ise them with African culture, language and with social and environmental regulations in Af-
rican countries. Equally founded in 2005, the International Poverty Reduction Centre 
(IPRCC) works closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other 
international organisations. The IPRCC is in charge of the promotion of international ex-
change, cooperation and research in the field of poverty reduction.  
NGOs play a quasi inexistent role in China’s relations with Africa. The “Global Environ-
mental Institute” can be indicated as one example for an NGO which began to set up projects 
in Africa (Interview with Western diplomat October 2008). In the light of growing tensions 
and scepticism in Africa against Chinese engagement, the Chinese government seems to be 
willing to promote people-to-people exchanges in order to enhance African knowledge about 
China and improve China’s image in Africa. The Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Youth League initiated a youth volunteer’s programme overseas in 2002. About 100 
youth volunteers have already been sent to five African countries, inter alia to teach Chinese. 
In December 2007 a first group of about 100 young people from 10 African countries visited 
China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). In addition, the Chinese government provides 
scholarships for African students to study in China. 
Chinese-Africa researchers have not yet received much attention and financial funding by the 
Chinese government, in comparison to research conducted on the United States or Japan. The 
main research is conducted at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing, the 
biggest social sciences think tank in China. In addition, Zhejiang University holds an impor-
tant centre for African studies. The Chinese government is planning to increase research on 
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development policy. However, it is unclear if funding for research on Africa will also be in-
creased. Chinese Africa scholars build very much on Western research on Africa, and until 
recently, many researchers did not have the possibility to travel to Africa for conduct research 
(interview with Chinese scholar October 2008). 
Preliminary results: Diversification of actors leading to tensions? 
Altogether, the Chinese government has initiated an innovative approach towards Africa, 
combining different bureaucratic, corporate, private and individual Chinese actors. Through a 
mixture of diplomacy and economic assistance, the Chinese leadership creates a favourable 
environment for Chinese investments in Africa and trade relations with African countries.  
However, as indicated above, the growing number of actors and their diverging interests are 
causing several problems. First of all, local protests in African countries against Chinese 
companies are continually increasing. The central government assumes that supporting Chi-
nese companies going to and operating in Africa would imply a win-win situation for both, 
China and Africa. However, as Chinese companies aim at making profit, they often do not 
stick to labour or environmental regulations, causing growing civil society protests in African 
countries. One major problem is that Chinese companies frequently are not familiar with local 
conditions, with regulations such as labour and environmental standards, with the culture, the 
language, etc. In addition, they face sever competition causing them to cut down wages and 
safety standards. Not only African workers, but also Chinese employed in Africa have been 
protesting at Chinese embassies and on the street (Reilly / Na 2007). Local protests in African 
countries are likely to grow. Protest can be expected, particularly in African states with strong 
labour unions and active civil society, where mobilisation may be easier. At the same time, 
African governments have some leeway in negotiating the contracts with the Chinese leader-
ship. Thus, in countries with strong rule of law and civil society, contracts can be expected to 
be more in favour of employing local workers, and Chinese companies can be expected to 
make more efforts to employ local workers and to stick to labour and environmental regula-
tions. 
Not least due to growing international pressure, the MOFCOM made efforts to improve the 
situation, and established an office for addressing complaints and passed regulations to protect 
the rights of Chinese overseas workers. It has introduced rather comprehensive and rigid regu-
lations for Chinese companies in order to prompt them to behave in a responsible manner in 
Africa (Ho 2008). Some of the problems are also well known in China. Chinese Companies 
that do not comply with or only insufficiently implement social and environmental regulations 
within China will most probably refrain from doing the same abroad (Zhang 2008; interview 
with Western diplomat in Beijing October 2008). In summer 2007, MOFCOM organised 
workshops to sensitize Chinese companies. However, MOFCOM will face difficulties in en-
forcing these regulations due to adverse incentives listed above and due to the institutional 
setting.  
Conflicting interests between different stakeholders emerge and test the state capacity to en-
force regulations abroad. In African countries, the Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ 
offices are responsible for implementing the MOFCOM regulations and providing informa-
tion about activities of Chinese firms. However, the ECCs have no direct line of authority 
over the Chinese corporations, which are subordinated to the SASAC. At the same time, the 
MOFCOM also has only operational authority over ECC officials, which gives ECC officials 
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additional leeway. Consequently, incentives for local low-ranking ECC officers to negatively 
report about SOE to Beijing are quite small. The interest of SASAC and the SOE is to maxi-
mise the economic profit. Since the SASAC sits at the same bureaucratic level as MOFCOM, 
it is even more difficult for MOFCOM to actively enforce regulations and incite SOE to im-
plement social and environmental standards (Reilly / Na 2007). As one scholar states: “If the 
CEO of a State-owned enterprise gets the signature of a member of the Central Committee, 
the company can bypass any MOFCOM regulation” (Interview with Chinese scholar October 
2008). The detailed possibilities of the Chinese leadership to regulate, oversee and control the 
activities of private firms and SOE in Africa are not quite clear. However, the relations of 
principals and agents, as outlined above, indicate that it is rather unlikely that MOFCOM will 
be able to actively enhance their new regulations, at least in the near future. 
Implementing aid projects is another challenge for the Chinese. For the MFA and Chinese 
leadership, development assistance is mainly perceived as a diplomatic tool to improve bilat-
eral relations, often in order to secure access to natural resources. The interest of MOFCOM is 
to improve the economic benefit of the aid projects, to increase job opportunities for Chinese 
workers and guarantee contracts for Chinese firms. However, Chinese corporations aim at 
accomplishing the project as quickly as possible. They often reduce costs to the detriment of 
labour wages, safety standards, etc. These corporations are often affiliated with the provincial 
or city level, and provincial and city governments encourage them to get a stake in Chinese 
international assistance projects (Reilly / Na 2007). However, provincial and city govern-
ments do not necessarily share the interest of the central government to improve overall 
China-African relations and to improve the image of China in Africa. 
The instrumentalisation of aid projects as a diplomatic tool creates further problems: Chinese 
companies may take it as a blank check, allowing them to act in a fiscally irresponsible way; 
these companies can always rely on the state banks for financial support, independent of their 
fiscal performance. This creates long-term financial dependency on Chinese banks for state-
owned enterprises (Reilly / Na 2007). It has been said that one third of these enterprises have 
already incurred losses. This issue is becoming increasingly pressing when more or even 
higher credits are provided by the banks. One expert particularly highlights the interest of 
EXIM bank to provide profitable credits and thus to cooperate with Western banks in order to 
learn from their investment strategies (Interview with Western scholar in Paris September 
2008). 
The consequences of China’s engagement for African States and governance structures are 
disputed and so far not very well researched. For some, China’s engagement in Africa has 
reversed privatisation dynamics and the growing importance of non-state actors, lending insti-
tutions and donors. In this respects, China’s policies are considered to augment the bargaining 
power of African states. China is said to have “reintroduced the state into Africa’s interna-
tional relations” – arguably potentially at the expense of private actors. Yet, the increasing 
involvement of China’s corporations, acting as independent agents, could also contribute to 
the further increase of the power of local predacious elites and thus amplify the privatisation 
of Africa’s international relations (Huliaras / Magliveras 2008). 
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3.3 Chinese development policy in Africa: more than infrastructure 
Sino-African cooperation covers a broad range of areas from bi- and multilateral political co-
operation, economic cooperation, cooperation in social development as well as in peace and 
security. Since the first meeting of the FOCAC in 2000, cooperation has been expanded and 
deepened in many areas. There are five major areas in the field of development assistance that 
Chinese projects cover: infrastructure, health, agriculture and education. Although the main 
proportion of China’s development cooperation concentrates in certain countries, one special 
aspect of China’s policy in Africa is that it includes nearly all African countries. Official 
statements indicate that since the end of the 1950s China has implemented 700 aid projects in 
49 African countries (Asche / Schüller 2008). During the FOCAC meeting in 2006, China has 
announced doubling its development assistance for Africa, though without providing any 
baseline figures. 
Infrastructure projects take by far the major bulk of these projects, most of them being related 
to the promotion of the exploitation of resources and access to local markets. This scheme is 
not only bound to China’s comparative advantages in international competition, but also to 
China’s own developmental path (Asche / Schüller 2008). One of the most prestigious pro-
jects is the Tanzania-Zambia railway, completed in 1975 at an estimated cost of 484 million 
US$. Africans consider the project as a major symbol of China’s commitment, friendship and 
engineering capacity despite several technical shortfalls and drawbacks (Le Pere / Shelton 
2007, 58). Generally, China tends to favour high-profile infrastructure projects, such as stadi-
ums, dams, railroads or public buildings. Few European donors have continued to finance 
these types of projects. This offers China a niche and competitive edge for engagement, as 
they respond directly to the demands of African leaders. Concessional loans are concentrated 
in the field of infrastructure: about 40 percent are spent in the energy sector, 20 percent are 
invested in transport projects, 12 percent in telecommunication (Reilly / Na 2007). 
The overview of the areas of China’s development assistance projects indicate that China’s 
engagement is very much informed by its own domestic development and its own past experi-
ence. In comparison to European areas of development cooperation, China appears to be en-
gaged rather in traditional areas of assistance. For instance, China-Africa cooperation in the 
health sector has a very long tradition. Cooperation is concentrated on the dispatch of medical 
teams. Since 1964, about 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 47 African countries. China 
not only sends medical teams, but provides also medical equipment and medicine, for instance 
for the fight against Malaria. In addition, African doctors are trained and hospitals are built. 
From an African needs perspective, the agricultural sector is considered to be another particu-
larly important area of cooperation. It also receives increasing support from the Chinese gov-
ernment. China carries out irrigation projects, provides advisory services and technical 
equipments. As a consequence of China’s rapid economic growth, increasing wealth of Chi-
nese people and consequently growing demand of food products, food security becomes a 
pressing problem in China. Chinese investors have started to lease agricultural land for in-
stance in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. They also invest in agricultural industries in Na-
mibia or the cotton production in Zambia (Huliaras / Magliveras 2008; Alden 2005). 
In the area of education, the Chinese government has provided funding for African students to 
study in China and it has supported cooperation projects between Chinese and African univer-
sities. Estimates indicate that funding has been provided to 10,000 students coming from 51 
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African countries. About 900 of them are currently studying in China. 10 Chinese universities 
have cooperation programmes with 20 universities in 16 African countries (Le Pere / Shelton 
2007, 126). China supports the “African Human Resources Development Fund” which aims 
at providing training for administrative personnel. 7,000 people have already been funded via 
this project; up to 10.000 will further be supported during the next years (Hofmann 2006). 
Predictably, the promotion of good governance, civil society or reform of macroeconomic 
structures are absent in China’s aid. In May 2008, the Chinese government published a first 
interim report about the objectives that they had already achieved. The report indicates that 
China is very likely to meet its commitments on aid input. However, Chinese increasing en-
gagement also raises expectations towards the outcome of aid and changes perceptions. One 
scholar highlights that the discourse between Chinese and Africans during the three FOCAC 
meetings has already changed slightly and that China is de facto increasingly perceived as a 
donor country. 
4 Comparison of European and Chinese development policy concepts – 
growing convergence or divergence? 
Objectives and areas of European and Chinese development policy in Africa 
The objectives of European and Chinese policies towards Africa and the areas in which both 
sides are engaging seem to have some common ground, although with different emphasis. 
China primarily focuses on the promotion of economic and social development and sees the 
establishment of peace and security as an important condition for development. Hence, it pur-
sues rather traditional objectives of development policy with a strong focal point on the de-
velopment of infrastructure. However, the areas of Chinese development assistance seem to 
broaden and the Chinese government is increasing emphasises on social infrastructure. The 
promotion of peace and security is an objective of China’s policy towards Africa, although 
China does not actively contribute to its promotion in the context of its development assis-
tance. China does, however, increasingly participate in UN peacekeeping operations (see Box 
6). 
The European Union has put poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs at the core 
of its development policy. In addition, the EU aims at promoting a political and economic 
environment which is favourable and necessary for development. The objectives as well as 
the areas in which European development policy is engaged are thus broader than China’s 
objectives and fields of engagement. In addition, the EU clearly puts much more emphasis on 
political development, an aspect which is mostly missing in China’s strategies, for obvious 
reasons. 
This leads to the question whether Chinese and European policies could be complementary 
and whether stronger cooperation between the two providers of assistance is conceivable, or, 
on the contrary, if differences might rather result in competition and conflict. It is sometimes 
argued that the Chinese engagement could fill niches the EU has left open, creating probably 
windows of opportunity for cooperation (Dahle-Huse / Muyakwa 2008). An example for this 
niche approach could be infrastructure: China strongly engages in this sector, whereas the EU 
has rather neglected this area for some time. The EU has now increased its activities and the  
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visibility of these activities by establishing the Africa-EU partnership for infrastructure. 
Europe’s focus however, is more on trans-national and regional networks, whereas China of-
ten engages within an African country. An example for cooperation might also be the Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU), which has been signed by the Exim Bank and the World 
Bank in 2007. The MoU envisages developing cooperation projects in which the Chinese side 
would focus on the “hard infrastructure” and the World Bank would assist in questions of 
social and environmental standards. Infrastructure is also one of the four priority areas, identi-
fied by the Communication of the European Commission on trilateral dialogue, published in 
2008.30  
Nevertheless, different priorities with regard to objectives and areas of engagement could also 
lead to contradictory and conflicting policies and the expected impact could be missing.  
                                                 
30  In addition, the Communication specifies peace and security, sustainable management of natural resources 
and the environment as well as food security and agriculture. 
Box 7: EU and China in Africa at glance  
 EU-Africa China-Africa 
Trade 
 
Total 2007: 232 billion € 
About 23% of EU imports from Africa are 
manufactured goods, 11% are food and 
agricultural products. The EU is the biggest 
export market for African products.  
In 2007 the EU imported oil from Af-
rica with a value of 62.5 billion €, out of 
which 18.9 billion € are from sub-Saharan 
Africa (30%). Top partners: Libya, Algeria 
and Nigeria.  
African Least Development Countries bene-
fit from duty free market access for every-
thing but arms.  
Total 2008: 107 billion US$ 
72% of all imports from Africa are fuel 
and oil. China-Africa trade has been 
increasing by 45% since 2007. 
In 2007 China imported 32% of its oil 
from Africa with a value of 19 billion €, 
out of which 17 billion € are from sub-
Saharan Africa (90%). Top partners: 
Angola, Sudan, Congo. 
China abolished tariffs on 450 types of 
goods from 29 Least Development 
Countries in Africa. 
FDI 
EU Foreign Direct Investments to Africa in 
2005 and 2006 amounted to 28,124 billion € 
 
According to estimates, the accumu-
lated investment by Chinese firms dou-
bled from 6.27 billion US$ in 2005 to 
12 billion US$ in 2006. 
ODA 
total 
In 2007 the EU (Member States and EU 
Commission) gave together 62% of its bilat-
eral, regionally allocated aid to Africa and 
provided more than half of the global aid 
flows to the region. 
 
EU DAC members’ debt relief to Africa in 
2006: 9.7 billion €. 
China does not publish aid figures. Its 
aid comparable to the DAC definition of 
ODA is estimated at about 1.5 billion 
U$ p.a. 
 
China has cancelled 1.4 billion US$ in 
debt in 2006. 
Source: Based on European Commission (2008b) with author’s amendments and updates 
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Berger and Wissenbach (2007) suggest a pragmatic approach: “the combination of pragmatic 
policy mainstreaming on the one hand and a focus on complementarity on the other” could be 
a possibility for overcoming differences. However, more empirical analyses and case studies 
would be needed to provide insights that allow to thoroughly assess consequences of different 
priorities. 
Divergences with regard to European and Chinese norms, values and principles  
With regard to the principles and values of China and the EU’s development policy in Africa, 
the picture is complex and at least rhetoric differs considerably. Both actors have a different 
approach in their policies towards Africa. Since the turn of the century, the EU has been re-
forming its Africa policy and its development policy in order to overcome the traditional do-
nor-recipient relationship and to create a strategic partnership with a strong focus on owner-
ship, equality and alignment. Alongside Europe’s development cooperation, trade and foreign 
policy are distinct policy areas with differing decision-making procedures and differing ra-
tionale, yet increasingly acknowledge to have an impact on the development prospects of 
partner countries and thus aspired to be better coordinated with development policy (cf.  
Makhan 2009 forthcoming; Gänzle 2009). In contrast, China forges a relationship built on the 
(declared) principles of mutual benefit, non-interference, non-conditionality and under the 
overall banner of South-South cooperation. In this respect, Chinese development assistance 
forms only a small part of comprehensive package deals integrating trade, investments and 
diplomatic initiatives.  
Box 8: Different European and Chinese rhetorical issues in relations with Africa 
 EU China 
Objectives • eradication of poverty in context of 
sustainable development 
• achievement of MDGs  
• peace and security  
• democracy, good governance, human 
rights, fundamental freedoms 
(preconditions to poverty eradication 
an objectives in themselves) 
• promotion of peace and stability 
• economic and social development 
• harmonious development 
• common prosperity 
Principles • Ownership and African responsibility 
• Partnership 
• equality, solidarity 
 
 
 
• political dialogue, based on the 
assumption that improvements in 
governance are key to social and 
economic development 
• mutual benefit 
• friendship 
• equality, solidarity 
• reciprocity, mutual support and close 
coordination, learning from each other 
and seeking common development 
• five principles of peaceful coexistence 
and eight principles of aid to foreign 
countries 
• one-China principle 
• non-interference and ‘no conditions’ 
Source: Author’s composition, drawing from major European and Chinese policy papers 
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‘Non-interference’ versus promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance 
The most difficult and disputed areas are probably China’s principles of non-interference and 
non-conditionality in contrast to European attempts of promoting democracy, human rights 
and good governance. Since China’s policy does not comply with standards and norms set by 
the traditional donor community, it represents a welcomed alternative for African govern-
ments, possibly weakening the leverage of traditional donors while creating more leeway to 
take charge of their own development and increasing bargaining power. Although the Chinese 
government does not promote democracy and human rights in their relations towards Africa; 
it also does not aspire to undermine democratic regimes either. It does not claim creating a 
“league of dictators” or a “league of authoritarian states” in Africa (Alden 2007). Given the 
fact that foreign policy is predominantly an instrument serving domestic policy objectives, the 
Chinese leadership has no interest in imposing its own political system on African states. 
Instead, the Chinese government adopts a pragmatic approach, providing African govern-
ments with some leeway to shaping and influencing bilateral relations. 
Although the European Union has established an overall policy towards Africa, the strategies 
of the EU to promote good governance, democracy and human rights might be different vis-à-
vis individual African countries, depending on the domestic context, the political structure, as 
well as the capacities and power of civil society in the partner country (Börzel / Pamuk / 
Stahn 2008). It can therefore be expected that the consequences of China’s engagement for 
European attempts of promoting good governance, democracy and human rights and the rela-
tionship of China and the EU with respect to these principles, might also be different, depen-
ding on the domestic context of the African country (for this argument and the following see 
also Alden 2007). 
From a European perspective, China’s engagement in fragile democracies and authoritarian 
regimes such as Angola, Congo, or Nigeria might be most problematic. In authoritarian re-
gimes with stronger institutional structures, the EU aspires to introduce democracy and good 
governance (Börzel / Pamuk / Stahn 2008). The European influence on governance structures, 
however, depends on its ability to put pressure on African governments or to provide mea-
ningful incentives for reform. China is often perceived as a welcomed alternative to which the 
governments of these countries could turn if they do not agree with political and economic 
reform agendas. China’s engagement is dominated by state actors and bilateral agreements 
and projects are negotiated on a government-to-government basis without involvement of 
civil society actors. Therefore, China seems to strengthen and reinforce the ruling elite to the 
detriment of other actors, particularly from civil society. For civil society actors, the access to 
information on the content of agreed contracts would be particularly relevant. In many cases, 
no detailed contact information is provided by the Chinese and African governments. In this 
respect, Chinese policies in these countries might compete or even conflict with European 
objectives and principles. 
Chinese engagement in so called “rough regimes“, such as Sudan, Equatorial-Guinea, or Zim-
babwe, has attracted much attention in Western public debates. In these cases, China is accu-
sed to undermine Western sanctions and to hinder the conflict resolution process. Objectives 
and principles of Chinese and European policies seem to be clearly conflicting in their respec-
tive engagement of these regimes. However, China has slightly reconsidered and adjusted its 
own position in Sudan and Zimbabwe and the principle of non-interference seems to be inc-
reasingly debated in China, as argued above. The Chinese government did most probably not 
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just respond to international pressure. It can also be assumed that the Chinese leadership itself 
has an interest in the long-term stability and in low corruption rates of African countries to 
protect its own investments and Chinese actors in these countries. This interest can be expec-
ted to grow; the more China invests in Africa. EXIM Bank, for instance, will presumably pay 
closer attention to country risk and to countries indebtedness. This could provide possibilities 
for closer coordination and cooperation between China and traditional donors (Chaponnière 
2008), even more so as European debates about the linkage between security and develop-
ment have also moved in recent years (cf. Gänzle 2009). 
All in all, a major problem is that concrete data and analysis of the consequences of Chinese 
engagement on African governance structures and implications for European cooperation with 
African regimes remain limited. Concrete case studies therefore are highly needed to provide 
more empirical evidence for the elaborated arguments. 
Ownership, harmonisation and effectiveness 
One central element of the reform of European policy towards Africa is the strengthening of 
African ownership. China claims African ownership to be paramount in its South-South-
Cooperation and that it thus (in terms of the Paris Declaration) aligns to partner countries pri-
orities. The perspective, however, is limited to government ownership. The Chinese govern-
ment will only enter negotiations about development assistance projects when African go-
vernments request concrete projects. Negotiations are done on the basis of project proposals 
elaborated by the African government (Wang 2008). Beyond this government-to-government 
principle, however, the Chinese leadership does not align its own strategies with African nati-
onal development plans and with national poverty reduction strategies. This is regarded as the 
obligation of African states – arguably overestimating the political capacity of states in Africa 
even in the best of cases. In addition, decisions of MOFCOM are often taken on an ad hoc 
basis without elaborating long-term strategies for African countries. Since China often brings 
its own labour and material (albeit with varying degrees among countries in Africa), the trans-
fer of knowledge and the benefits for institutional capacity building in African states seem to 
be rather limited, particularly in the context of turn-key projects. 
An important objective of the European agenda is the enhancement and improvement of har-
monisation and co-ordination between different donors, with a view to improve the effective-
ness of aid. For China, harmonisation among donors is not a topic on the agenda. Harmonisa-
tion would have to begin with the Chinese participation in donor rounds. The Chinese practice 
in Africa is often not clear and levels of information differ, but China’s attendance of donor 
rounds remains probably rather anecdotal. For African countries with limited capacities, it 
could be problematic to coordinate and deal with another donor outside the frameworks of 
traditional donors. At the same time, for most African states China constitutes a welcomed 
alternative to Western cooperation – their interest in coordination among China and other do-
nors could thus arguably be limited. 
The enhancement of effectiveness and sustainability of development cooperation policy are 
key objectives of the European (and international) reform process. The debate in China, ho-
wever, is not on the same page as European discussions: The Chinese leadership considers its 
own development policy as effective per se, since it finances very concrete projects such as 
schools, hospitals, roads, etc. Direct negotiations with the African government without pas-
sing through multilateral channels are also highlighted by Chinese actors when their effecti-
 Christine Hackenesch 
54 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
veness is questioned. Chinese projects are delivered generally quicker and less costly. In addi-
tion, the Chinese government assumes that their approach impedes corruption (Wang 2008; 
He 2008a), even though the basis for this assumption is unclear. MOFCOM does not carry out 
systematic evaluation of their projects. Anecdotic evidence seems to indicate that projects 
often meet difficulties after the Chinese have left: school and hospitals remain empty, roads 
are not maintained etc. In this respect, the problems of Chinese projects appear to be similar 
to the problems of European infrastructure projects in the 1970s and 1980s. This might open 
possibilities for exchange on evaluation methods, although the interest of the Chinese go-
vernment in cooperation on this issue is not clear at the moment.  
Ideally, the Chinese engagement could prompt the EU to review its own (fragmented and thus 
cumbersome) practices and presumably streamline certain bureaucratic procedures (Grimm 
2008a). Some Chinese experts even consider that China would have the potential for beco-
ming an influential actor with regard to international discussion on aid effectiveness. They 
argue that China could make use of its twofold perspective: From its own experience it knows 
how to deal with donors. On the other hand, it can provide insights from its own development 
process which has shown key elements of national ownership for development (He 2008a). 
However, this would presume that China engages in discussions and actively participates in 
the international aid system. 
Chinese and European interests in Africa 
In the context of development policy, the issue of tied aid might become a contested question 
between the EU and China. The EU adopted two regulations in 2005, deciding to fully untie 
European aid to developing countries; Member States are also committed to this. Previously, 
the Commission had played an important role in the discussion taking place in the DAC, lea-
ding to the adoption of the recommendation for untying aid in the DAC in 2001. China’s aid 
to Africa is mostly tied. In some EU Member States the private sector has already raised con-
cern about competitive disadvantages and trade diversion of exports to Africa in the light of 
Chinese engagement. Pressure has been put on European governments to re-tie their deve-
lopment assistance. The question has been put on the table, particularly in France where 
construction companies feel the strong competition of Chinese enterprises. Even though ex-
perts do not expect that the decision of untying aid will be called into question (Interview with 
French expert September 2008). Some assume that the relative weight of bilateral aid as “the 
only real means of influence on aid and trade relations” could increase to the detriment of 
multilateral aid (Kohnert 2008). 
Beyond this, competition and conflicts could arise with regard to resource and energy inte-
rests, depending on how the interests on both sides evolve in this area. China’s development 
policy is inter alia closely linked to its resource interests. The EU has increasingly highligh-
ted the nexus between energy security and development and integrated energy security issues 
in developing countries in the spectrum of its development policy. In terms of European re-
sources interests, the African continent is currently an important, but far from the only provi-
der of resources. However, the EU seems to increasingly recognise the potential of African 
countries as energy providers (Hadfield / Youngs 2008). 
The comparison of Chinese and European political interests in Africa indicates that for both, 
development policy in Africa as well as political relations with African countries form an im-
portant element in their changing and emerging strategies towards global politics. The EU 
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wants to foster ‘effective multilateralism’. The support of African states and cooperation with 
Africa is one important element to practice this political commitment and achieve this objec-
tive. China, however, aims at promoting a ‘harmonious world’, composed of sovereign nation 
states which are peacefully cohabiting. African support, particularly in international relations 
is therefore also important for China. Recent voting patterns in several UN bodies seem to 
indicate that Europe and China could be increasingly competing in this regard (Gowan / 
Brantner 2008).  
Different set of actors in Chinese and European relations with Africa 
Different types of actors are responsible for development cooperation and overall relations 
with Africa in China and Europe. In China, the MOFCOM has a very prominent role and is 
mainly in charge of development policy, which indicates a strong relation between develop-
ment and trade policy. In Europe and China, different types of actors are responsible for deve-
lopment cooperation and overall relations with Africa. In China, the Ministry of Commerce 
takes a prominent role, indicating a strong relation between development and trade policy. In 
Europe, specific actors such as the specialised Directorate-General for Development at EU 
level or national ministries of development cooperation (or departments in foreign ministries) 
are in charge of aid policies. Arguably, this institutional separation reduces to some extent the 
possibility that development policy is instrumentalised by other foreign relations interests. 
Yet, with institutional changes occurring, it will be important to see, which domestic actors 
will gain influence on Europe’s Africa policy-making, and to follow their respective interests 
in relations with Africa. 
Europe and China both face important challenges with regard to the actors involved in deve-
lopment policy and overall cooperation with Africa. In Europe, there is a strong need to inc-
rease coherence and coordination between the multitude of actors and thus to implement poli-
cy documents such as the code of conduct on a division of labour. In China, not only the coo-
peration between different actors needs to be improved, but also the regulatory and implemen-
tation capacities of the state. Therefore, it can be expected that the prospects for cooperation 
between China and Europe on African development will, at first, depend mostly on the capa-
cities of both sides to implement either reform initiatives (Europe) or build up institutional 
structures for development policy (China). 
5 Conclusions 
Europe and China are both in an important phase of reforming (Europe) or designing (China) 
their development policies towards Africa and their external relations more broadly. The EU 
and China are both seeking new roles in international relations, they are both aspiring to evol-
ve from a regional to a global power and for both of them, the African continent constitutes an 
important arena in this respect. The EU is looking for a new role in its relations with Africa 
and more broadly in world affairs – and is thus also an emerging actor in international poli-
tics. China’s role as an actor is also strongly evolving at the international level. It has to conci-
liate its aspirations to become a global power with its self-image as a developing country. 
The comparison of Chinese and European development policy in Africa demonstrates that 
both entities have some common ground regarding their objectives. Their respective approa-
ches and ways of achieving these objectives, however, are undoubtedly very different: prin-
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ciples and norms, the type of actors involved in development policy as well as the range of 
areas in which they are engaging differ substantially. 
At the same time, there is some evidence that both actors influence and impact on the policy 
process of the other as well as on the pace of reforming policies and institutions. On the one 
hand, China’s increasingly important presence in Africa arguably puts more pressure on the 
overly complex EU system to reform and pushes the EU stronger to adhere to its commit-
ments. The decision of the European Union, for instance, to hold the Africa summit in 2007 
despite the controversies about the participation of President Mugabe was certainly affected 
by the Chinese-African FOCAC meeting in 2006. On the other hand, more broad pressure 
exerted by the EU and the international community certainly has an influence on China’s po-
licies vis-à-vis African countries, for example, on the formulation of regulations, such as the 
guidelines for Chinese enterprises issued by the MOFCOM. 
Africa has become a prominent topic in overall EU-China relations. The capacities of the EU 
and China to successfully cooperate on their respective relations with African countries are 
often considered as a “soft test case” for the success of the EU-China strategic partnership. 
Prospects for closer cooperation of these two different policy approaches might depend on 
several factors. 
Prospects for cooperation or competition and conflict 
European and Chinese policy approaches, norms and principles of cooperation with African 
countries are very different; therefore, concrete cooperation will depend on the results of the 
dialogues and exchange initiatives, which are already laid down. It is unlikely that either in 
China or in the EU underlying belief systems, perceptions or strategic cultures would funda-
mentally change in the near future. However, mutual understanding of the perceptions, norms 
and values of the partner could already represent an important first step that can facilitate fu-
ture cooperation. 
Potentially more far-reaching, the evolution of Chinese and European economic, resource and 
political interests in comparison to development policy objectives will influence the prospects 
for concrete cooperation between the EU and China. The willingness and capacities of Euro-
pean actors to push for cooperation will certainly be influenced by the evolution of European 
resource and economic interests in Africa, which are currently rather low. The same can be 
expected for China. China’s willingness to cooperate with European actors and other traditio-
nal donors will also often depend on the overall benefits China can gain through cooperation. 
For the time being, China’s attractiveness for African countries results partly because China is 
not a member of the “donor club”, but acts outside the existing structures. It can thus be refer-
red to when Western donors refuse funding. Despite this Chinese “joker” position for African 
countries, China’s growing investments and trade activities is likely to result in an increase of 
China’s interest in cooperation with other external actors in Africa, as outlined above – it has 
increasingly more to lose in critical situations. 
Against this background, the constellations and power structures among domestic actors in 
the EU as well as in China will have important impacts on their respective external relations. 
Generally, some parts of the Chinese ruling elite seem to be much more in favour of internati-
onal cooperation than others (Leonard 2008), and different actors involved in China’s deve-
lopment projects might have different degrees of interest in cooperating with the EU and other 
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traditional donors. The outcome of this internal strive for influence is not yet clear, but will 
determine much of China’s external policy. The European Union, for its part, will have to 
deliver on the reforms it has been engaged to do in order to (re-)gain credibility. The EU can, 
for instance, hardly expect China to harmonize its policies with traditional donors if harmoni-
sation cannot be achieved among EU Member States and the Commission. In addition, the EU 
will have to be clearer about its own interest in promoting cooperation and dialogue with Chi-
na and Africa, i.e. the rhetoric of “help” might have to be considered, as has already been do-
ne with the renewed European emphasis on partnership.  
The future relationship between the European and Chinese development policies in Africa 
will also be shaped by the structure of the international aid system and the fora it provides. 
The comparison of the EU and China’s conceptions of development policy has demonstrated 
that for the time being, there are few common notions and concepts. It would be necessary to 
build and/or strengthen international fora, ideally under the umbrella of the UN, in which all 
actors (including African states) are represented. In 2007 the Development Cooperation Fo-
rum (DCF) was launched. The DCF is an exchange platform that feeds into international ne-
gotiations, for instance, the High level Forum or the Conference on Financing for Develop-
ment. This is a first step in bringing developing countries, “new donors” and traditional do-
nors together. The DCF will have to shift to discussions about jointly agreed definitions of 
development cooperation and common standards in order to avoid becoming yet another ‘talk 
shop’. 
A great deal – if not all – will depend on how African countries approach these matters. China 
will not engage and participate in the international aid system if African countries do not push 
for their involvement, whereas criticism from the African side on some development-
unfriendly practises of Chinese actors could probably have an important impact (He 2008a). 
These critics are most likely to be found amongst actors with comparable value systems than 
European actors, i.e. African states with democratic systems of governance and (sub)regional 
organisations with an explicit “good governance” agenda like NEPAD, the African Union or 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or others. 
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